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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers the role accorded to, and importance of, the public 
interest objectives of the South African Competition Act1 (the Act). The aim of this 
paper is not to critique these objectives or to consider what role these objectives have 
played in South African competition jurisprudence in the eleven years since the 
enactment of the Act, but to accept such objectives and specifically consider what 
effect has been given to them in the other provisions of the Competition Act that 
expressly deal with the public interest, 2
 
 and to argue that the competition authorities 
should not be too eager to diminish the importance of these sections, but that the 
public interest should play an important role in the competition law of South Africa 
and other developing nations, and as such, that the South African competition 
authorities should recognise this. 
Competition law was birthed in the United States of America (where it is 
commonly labelled as ‘antitrust law’) and has rapidly developed into a global 
phenomenon. The most extensive and impressive competition authorities are located 
in the developed countries of the world such as the United States, Japan and the 
European Union (which includes some of the most developed nations of the world). 
This paper will argue that competition law in these jurisdictions cannot be presumed 
to be replicated in South Africa or other developing countries of the world. South 
Africa’s history of Apartheid, location as an African country and status as a 
developing country are some factors which impinge upon its competition laws and 
policies, thus requiring a somewhat different stance. This paper will seek to argue 
that public interest objectives and considerations are more important to the 
competition law and policy of developing countries than to developed countries, and 
South Africa should not be too eager to emasculate the public interest provisions of 
the Competition Act. 
 
The approach of South African Competition law is, in general, consistent 
with that of foreign jurisprudence3
                                                                    
1 Act 89 of 1998. 
, however the Act goes further by giving public 
2 Namely, sections 10 and 12A of the Competition Act. 
3 A brief overview of the various schools of thought on the purpose(s) of competition law and of some 
of the approaches to competition law in important foreign jurisdictions will be provided in Chapter 2 
of the this paper. 
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interest considerations particular importance in the preamble of the Act and by 
listing a number of public interest objectives of South African Competition law in 
section 2 of the Act, alongside the traditional purpose of competition law, which is 
the enhancement of consumer welfare through, at least primarily, efficiency. The 
reactions of the international community to the listing of these public interest 
considerations as objectives in the South African Act has not been particularly 
favourable;4
 
 however these public interest purposes have not been amended or 
removed from the Act and as such, at least from the legislature’s perspective, remain 
a crucial part of South African competition law. 
Public interest considerations are accorded further importance in section 12A 
of the Act in relation to merger control. Section 12A(3) lists the public interest 
grounds that must be considered by the competition authorities in determining 
whether such a merger can or cannot be justified on public interest grounds. There 
has been a substantial amount of South African jurisprudence concerning merger 
control and as such, these public interest grounds have attracted significant attention 
from the competition authorities. This paper will examine the numerous judgments 
of the competition authorities and in so doing, attempt to ascertain the general policy 
of the authorities with regard to the importance of these grounds and further, analyse 
whether the approach of the authorities is the correct one, given the South Africa’s 
context, the preamble and the stated purposes of the Act.   
 
This paper will also consider the role of the public interest with regard to 
exemptions of agreements and practices from the application of the provisions of the 
Act.5
 
 The fulfilment of the Act’s public interest objectives is expressed most vividly 
in merger control, however, section 10 presents a number of instances where the 
public interest may justify an exemption. As such, these objectives will be analysed, 
and it will be again be shown that the South African context is vital in understanding 
the application of such provisions. 
                                                                    
4 L Reyburn (ed) Competition Law of South Africa (Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) at 4-4; 
Msomi t/a Minnie Cigarette Wholesalers v British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
49/IR/Jul02 para 45. 
5 Competition Act s 10(3). 
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In addition, this paper will seek to analyse comparative jurisprudence, with 
particular emphasis on developing countries, such as Indonesia and Brazil, and will 
show the importance of the public interest objectives of the South African Act to 
South Africa. It will be argued that the competition laws of developing countries 
cannot and should not imitate those of the developed world, rather, the competition 
laws of the developed world should respond to the challenges particular to the 
developed world. In arguing this, this paper will consider the jurisprudence of 
developed nations and contrast such jurisprudence with that of South Africa and 
other developing nations. 
 
Finally, this paper will argue that perhaps the balance between traditional 
economic-motivated competition law purposes, and public interest competition 
purposes in South Africa, has not been adequately achieved. The competition 
authorities have been too eager to glance over the importance of public interest 
considerations in South Africa and attempt to transform our law into that of the 
United States or European Union. Perhaps, instead, the public interest should be 
more carefully considered, not as the primary purpose of competition law, but as a 
relevant subsidiary purpose. 
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2. THE PREAMBLE AND PURPOSES OF THE 
COMPETITON ACT 
Despite the rapid development of competition law across the globe, the 
underlying basis for competition law remains controversial.6
 
 The Chicago school 
advocates that efficiency alone should be the goal of competition law, and other 
considerations such as the public interest should not operate in the realm of 
competition law. Despite its influence, however, this view is not universally 
accepted. The purpose of many competition jurisdictions, however, including that of 
South Africa, is not limited to efficiency, but includes other aims. 
2.1 Preamble 
The preamble of the South African Act clearly highlights that South African 
competition law is not concerned with efficiency alone. 
 
The preamble explicitly highlights the political motivations of the 
Competition Act,7
provide all South Africans equal opportunity to participate fairly in the national economy;  
 it shows the relevance and importance of South’s Africa’s 
discriminatory Apartheid history and that such history prevented ‘full and free 
participation in the economy by all South Africans’. Such is the background to the 
enactment of the statute – it is both economical and political in its motivations. The 
Act submits that, as a result of the prevention of full and free participation in the 
economy by all South Africans, ‘the economy must be open to greater ownership by 
a greater number of South Africans’ and that ‘credible competition law, and effective 
structures to administer that law, are necessary for an efficient functioning 
economy’. Finally, the preamble argues that an efficient, competitive economic 
environment, balancing the interests of workers, owners and consumers and focussed 
on development, will benefit all South Africans’. The preamble continues to state 
that the Competition Act was enacted in order to: 
achieve a more effective and efficient economy in South Africa; 
provide for markets in which consumers have access to, and can freely select, the quality and 
variety of goods and services they desire; 
                                                                    
6 Reyburn (note 4) at 4-3. 
7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ‘Competition Law and Policy in South 
Africa: An OECD Peer Review’ 2003 at 18. 
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create greater capability and an environment for South Africans to compete effectively in 
international markets; 
restrain particular trade practices which undermine a competitive economy; 
regulate the transfer of economic ownership in keeping with the public interest;  
establish independent institutions to monitor economic competition; and give effect to the 
international law obligations of the Republic. 
 
Clearly then, the preamble recognises the importance of regulating and 
administering a competitive economic environment, whilst at the same time 
recognising the importance of redressing economic injustices of the past through 
competition law. Despite what many commentators may think of the preamble, it has 
remained unchanged and its provisions will continue to ‘be important in interpreting 
the Act and the entire corpus of competition law’.8 The preamble does recognise the 
problem of inefficiency and the need to address this problem through competition 
law, however, the preamble goes far further by describing restrictions upon free 
competition as not merely ‘inefficient’ but as ‘unjust’.9
 
 This is a clear indicator that 
in South Africa, free and fair competition is closely linked with justice – which goes 
far beyond achieving efficiency.  
2.2 Purposes 
The primary and general purpose of South African Competition law is to 
‘promote and maintain competition’10, this much is patently obvious from the 
wording of the Act. This general purpose is, however, supplemented with eight 
specific objectives. It is argued, and such argument is correct, that unlike some other 
competition jurisprudence, South African competition law is ‘intended to fulfil 
multifarious goals’.11
                                                                    
8 Reyburn (note 4) at 4-5. 
 The first two of these eight specified goals are amount to the 
‘traditional’ objectives of competition law which are common to most competition 
jurisdictions, objectives (c) to (f) are concerned primarily with the public interest, 
9 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ‘Competition Law and Policy in South 
Africa: An OECD Peer Review’ 2003 at 18. 
10 Competition Act s 2. 
11 Reyburn (note 4) at 4-3. 
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whilst the new additions of objectives of (g) and (h)12 are clearly not concerned with 
the public interest, but with competition.13
The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in order – 
 
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
(b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
(c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of 
South Africans; 
(d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets 
and recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic; 
(e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the economy; 
(f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the 
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons; 
(g) to detect and address conditions in the market for any particular goods or 
services, or any behaviour within such market, that tends to prevent, 
restrict or distort competition in connection with the supply o acquisition 
of those goods or services within in the Republic; and 
(h) to provide for consistent application of common standards and policies 
affecting competition within all markets and sectors of the economy. 
 
The four public interest objectives of South African competition law are 
concerned with the public interest, or are, what Eleanor Fox terms, ‘equity 
objectives’.14
                                                                    
12 Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. 
 The importance of these four aims is evident – they are explicitly 
stated in the ‘purposes’ section of the Act and as such, are obviously intended, at 
least by the legislators, to play an important role in South African competition law. 
The importance of these public interest considerations must not, however, be 
overstated. The primary purpose of competition law in South Africa remains the 
promotion and maintenance of competition; that much is clear from section 2. 
Furthermore, in consideration of the eight particular sets of goals, it is evident that 
the four public interest considerations are mentioned as secondary to the goals of 
promoting efficiency and providing consumers with competitive prices and product 
choices. The position of the public interest goals in the section 2 list makes this 
13 Competition Act s 2. 
14 E.M Fox ‘Equality, Discrimination in Competition law: lessons from and for South African and 
Indonesia’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 579 at 580. 
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clear.15
 
 Thus, the public interest goals of the Competition Act are not accorded 
primacy in South Africa; rather, they are important secondary goals which should 
also shape South African competition law. 
The section 2 list of purposes was borrowed, for the most part, from the 
primary competition statute of Canada: The Canadian Competition Act.16
‘to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and 
adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian 
participation in world markets while at the same time recognizing the role of foreign 
competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an 
equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy and in order to provide 
consumers with competitive prices and product choices’. 
 Section 1.1 
of that Act states that the purpose of the Act is to: 
Of the stated Canadian purposes, it appears that the only South African additions are 
‘to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans’ and ‘to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the 
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons’. These additions indicate 
that, in South Africa, competition law has been specifically tailored to address public 
interest concerns alongside the main purpose of promoting and maintaining 
competition. It is only very recently that two further additions have been made to the 
list of section 2 purposes of the South African Act.17
 
 Whilst these additional 
purposes do not focus upon the public interest, it remains clear that the purposes of 
South African competition law are strongly aligned with the public interest. 
  
                                                                    
15 M Brassey (ed) Competition Law (Lansdowne: Juta, 2002) at 2. The addition of objectives (g) and 
(h) to section 2 does not imply that these objectives are less important than the public interest 
objectives of the Act. Rather, it is submitted that these objectives, like those concerned with the public 
interest, are of secondary importance to objectives (a) and (b). 
16 Canadian Competition Act C-34. 
17 The Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 was promulgated on August 28th 2009. 
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3. RECONCILLING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN COMPETITION ACT 
Given the multifarious nature of the objectives of South African competition 
law, as listed in section 2 of the Competition Act, it remains to be seen how such 
objectives can be reconciled to each other. It is patently obvious that all eight 
objectives cannot be simultaneously fulfilled all the time and therefore a mechanism, 
or mechanisms, must exist to balance these objectives. It is also obvious that some 
objectives will, as shown in the previous chapter, commonly trump others. 
 
The initial academic response to the inclusion of multifarious goals in the 
Competition Act (four of which are of a public interest nature), was far from 
favourable. The majority of the arguments against the inclusion of public interest 
goals in the Act centred on the concern that including such objectives would dilute 
the Act to an instrument that does not give considerable weight to traditional 
competition aims and issues. 
 
One of the strongest arguments against the inclusion of public interest 
objectives alongside traditional objectives of competition law is that, not only may 
public interest objectives pull competition law in an opposite direction to that of the 
traditional objectives of competition law, but different public interest objectives may 
themselves pull in opposite directions, thus causing much uncertainty and requiring 
the competition authorities to engage in extensive balancing enquiries. This remains 
a concern of competition law in South Africa, however, it is submitted that balancing 
legal objectives is a common feature of much legislation and is not a definitive 
reason for the rejection of the public interest objectives from competition law. 
 
A further argument made which is against the inclusion of public interest objectives 
in the Act is that it is inappropriate to rely upon competition policy to achieve the 
listed public interest objectives. Instead, it is argued, there are more suitable and 
effective policies and mechanisms available that can be used in achieving these 
objectives.18
                                                                    
18 W Reekie Duncan ‘The Competition Act, 1998: An Economic Perspective’ (1999) 67(2) South 
African Journal of Economics at 283. 
 This argument is significant, though, given South Africa’s specific 
profile as well as the effect which competition law and policy has upon the economy, 
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it is quite reasonable to rely somewhat upon competition law to contribute to 
achieving the listed public interest objectives. One further argument made was that 
including public interest objectives would simply place too large a burden on the 
competition authorities and result in delays and the creation of unnecessary 
litigation.19
 
 Practice over the past ten years has, however, shown that a consideration 
of the public interest by the authorities does not negatively burden their effective 
regulation. 
Despite these arguments, it is now widely held that the explicit inclusion of 
such public interest objectives in the Act was a very good development of 
competition law in South Africa, as decisions can now ‘invoke these factors directly 
and transparently, rather than try disingenuously to justify actions on competition 
grounds when they really respond to other interests.’20
 
 Given the state of the South 
African economy after the collapse of Apartheid, it would be ludicrous to suggest 
South African competition law and policy, function independently of pursuing public 
interest objectives. 
It remains to be discussed, however, how exactly the multifarious goals of 
the Act are to be reconciled to each other. To date, it appears certain that the 
competition authorities have attached primary weight to the achievement of the first 
two objectives of the Act, that is: 
The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in order – 
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
(b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
This is not to say that the public interest objectives have not been advanced by the 
competition authorities at all, it is merely to say that case law shows the authorities 
according primacy to the above listed objectives. 
 
Where substance has been given to the section 2 public interest objectives is in 
section 12A, concerning merger evaluation, and section 10, concerning exemptions 
on public interest grounds. A substantial section of this paper will address these two 
                                                                    
19 See Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited/Goldfields Limited 93/LM/Nov04, where Goldfields 
Limited argued extensively for the importance of the public interest in the merger evaluation. 
Interestingly, the case, ultimately, had little to do with traditional competition issues and more to do 
with arguments as to the public interest. 
20 OECD Peer Review (South Africa) (2003) at 18. 
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sections and the jurisprudence relating to them, and consider how they give effect to 
the public interest objectives of section 2. 
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4. PLACING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ACT IN CONTEXT 
Before engaging in an analysis of South African competition law and the 
public interest, it is necessary to briefly describe the context within which the 
Competition Act was enacted and remains in force today.  
 
South Africa’s economic history is one which has been dominated and 
fuelled by racial discrimination. The policies of the Apartheid government ensured 
that the interests of whites and white-owned firms superseded those of blacks and 
black-owned firms. This discrimination manifested in multiple forms including land 
reservation for white ownership, preferential treatment of white-owned firms, 
monopoly concessions, and the establishment of massive state-owned enterprises 
which only served to perpetuate the entrenched racial discrimination. 
 
South Africa’s history of competition law began, in earnest, with the 
enactment of the first competition legislation in 1955, the Regulation of 
Monopolistic Conditions Act 195521 (the 1955 Act). This Act defined the criteria by 
which to address monopolistic conditions as ‘the public interest’, yet a definition of 
the public interest was not provided by the Act. The Act suffered from a number of 
shortcomings, namely, it did not expressly deal with mergers, nor did it contain 
express prohibitions on certain conduct and, furthermore, enforcement only took 
place by a Board upon the directive of the Minister.22 The result was a Board with 
weak investigative and enforcement powers and a situation which allowed for much 
scope for political interference.23 It was furthermore clear that the Minister would 
never direct investigation into State activities and as such, the State’s activities 
would remain free from competition regulation.24 Ultimately, the 1955 Act achieved 
very little,25
 
 however, it does represent the beginnings of competition law in South 
African and highlight the discriminatory nature of previous competition laws. 
                                                                    
21 Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act 24 of 1955. 
22 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act, 1955 (1978) 
(the ‘Mouton Commission Report’).  
23 Reyburn (note 4) at 3-30. 
24 Ibid; Mouton Commission Report paras 116, 120-123; OECD Peer Review (South Africa) (2003) at 
12. 
25 Reyburn (note 4) at 3-30. 
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In 1979, the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act26 (the 1979 Act) 
was enacted by Parliament. The 1979 Act represented an improvement on the 1955 
Act, however, whilst the public interest remained a key consideration of the Act, 
what amounted to as the ‘public interest’ remained as the interests of the elite white 
majority, not the general public. A Competition Board was established by the Act 
which was more independent than the Board of Trade under the 1955 Act, however, 
the Competition Board continued to primarily be constituted by white male civil 
servants and thus, like its predecessor, remained unable to effectively investigate and 
enforce against state-owned enterprises.27 Thus, the reality of South African 
competition law, even after the enactment of the 1979 Act and its amendments, was 
a lack of a comprehensive and adequate competition statute in South Africa.28
 
 
In 1994, the South African political landscape underwent significant change: 
the African National Congress (ANC) was elected the governing party in South 
Africa. The ANC had set out a number of economic objectives before the 1994 
elections in its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994, which 
was echoed as the government’s White Paper on Reconstruction and Development.29 
As part of this White Paper, the ANC proposed competition laws that were broadly 
aimed at the promotion of traditional economic goals through stricter laws, but also 
sought to serve a broader political and social purpose.30
 
 
A national census was conducted in 1996, just two years before the 
enactment of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. The statistics revealed by the census 
were not unexpected, however, the extent of some of the results were alarming. The 
census revealed that the population of South Africa was overwhelmingly 
(approximately 76.7%)31
 
 ‘African/Black’ and yet it was evident that most of the 
wealth of the country rested in and was controlled by a small white minority. Table 1 
(below) and Graph 1 (below) highlight South African demographics as determined 
by the 1996 census. 
                                                                    
26 Act 96 of 1979. 
27 Robert Legh in M Brassey (ed) Competition Law (Lansdowne: Juta, 2002) at 78. 
28 Ibid at 80-81. 
29 White Paper for Reconstruction and Development (GG 16085 of 23 November 1994). 
30 Ibid chap 3.8. 
31 Statistics South Africa 1996 Census, 2.6. 
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Table 1: Population group by province (percentages) – October 1996. 
 
  Eastern Cape 
Free 
State Gauteng 
Kwazulu- 
Natal 
Mpuma- 
langa 
Northern 
Cape 
Northern 
Province 
North 
West 
Western 
Cape 
South 
Africa 
African/ Black 86.4 84.4 70.0 81.7 89.2 33.2 96.7 91.2 20.9 76.7 
Coloured 7.4 3.0 3.8 1.4 0.7 51.8 0.2 1.4 54.2 8.9 
Indian/ Asian 0.3 0.1 2.2 9.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 1.0 2.6 
White 5.2 12.0 23.2 6.6 9.0 13.3 2.4 6.6 20.8 10.9 
Unspecified/Other 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.6 1.5 0.7 0.5 3.1 0.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Graph 1: Percentage of the population in South Africa by population group – 
October 1996. 
 
 
 
The census, see Table 2 (below),  revealed that, not only was the white 
population a small minority of the South African population, it was also the 
population grouping with the highest employment percentage. The black population 
of South Africa, however, suffered from an unemployment rate in 1996 in the region 
of 42%.32
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
32 Statistics South Africa 1996 Census 2.30. 
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Table 2: Economically active population by population group amongst those 
aged 15 - 65 years. 
 
 
African/ 
Black Coloured Indian/ Asian White 
Unspecified 
/Other Total 
Employed       
Male 3,506,509 633,417 234,583 1,060,736 46,658 5,481,903 
Female 2,175,968 496,099 128,903 795,716 35,258 3,631,944 
Total 5,682,476 1,129,515 363,486 1,856,452 81,917 9,113,847 
Unemployed       
Male 1,810,570 141,555 29,312 45,938 12,543 2,039,917 
Female 2,395,421 157,676 21,068 43,127 14,437 2,631,730 
Total 4,205,992 299,231 50,379 89,066 26,980 4,671,647 
Total       
Male 5,317,079 774,971 263,895 1,106,674 59,201 7,521,820 
Female 4,571,389 653,775 149,971 838,843 49,696 6,263,673 
Total 9,888,468 1,428,746 413,866 1,945,517 108,897 13,785,493 
 
 
Graph 2: Unemployment rates by population group and gender – October 1996. 
 
 
 
The 1996 census clearly reveals the extent of the effect of the discriminatory 
policies of past South African governments. It is unsurprising that, in the light of 
these statistics, the ANC sought to implement a new competition policy after being 
elected to government in 1994. The new competition policy was eventually 
submitted to parliament as the Competition Bill in 1998 and later enacted as the 
Competition Act 89 of 1998. The new Act clearly aimed at strict competition 
regulation so as to pursue economic goals, however, the objective of redressing the 
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problems of the past through competition law took shape as the public interest 
objectives in Section 2 and the public interest considerations in sections 10 and 12A. 
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5. MERGER CONTROL AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 The approach of the competition authorities to the public interest 
grounds in merger evaluation 
The public interest plays its largest role in South African competition law in 
the realm of merger evaluation. The Competition Act accords particular importance 
to a list of four considerations of the public interest in this regard.33
 
 The relevant 
section in relation to merger evaluations is section 12A.   
The process for evaluating a merger by the Tribunal or Commission involves 
initially and, it appears from the structure of the subsection, primarily, determining 
‘whether or not the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, by 
assessing the factors set out in subsection (2)’. If the proposed merger is found likely 
to substantially prevent or lessen competition, then section 12A(1)(a)(ii) provides 
that the competition authorities must also determine ‘whether the merger can or 
cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds by assessing the factors set 
out in subsection (3)’. Section 12A(1)(b), on the other hand, provides that should it 
be found that the merger does not substantially prevent or lessen competition, the 
Tribunal should nevertheless engage in an enquiry to ‘determine whether the merger 
can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds by assessing the 
factors set out in subsection (3)’. It has been argued that section 12A(1) is not, 
however, formulated in the clearest of terms and, as a result, has been the subject of 
extensive argument and debate before the competition authorities. 
 
In the case of Harmony Gold Co / Goldfields Ltd34, the Tribunal correctly 
concluded that the primary concern for the Tribunal in merger evaluation is a 
competition evaluation, not a public interest evaluation, because that is exactly what 
the wording of the Competition Act requires.35
                                                                    
33 See Competition Act s 12A. 
 The proposed merger, if found to not 
be anticompetitive, may then either be approved on public interest grounds as well, 
with or without conditions; or rejected on public interest grounds, despite being 
34 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited/Goldfields Limited 93/LM/Nov04. 
35 Ibid at para 41. 
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found to be not anticompetitive. If the proposed merger is, however, found to be 
anticompetitive, such a finding may be bolstered by the finding that the merger 
would be against the public interest, or the merger may even be approved on public 
interest grounds, despite it being anticompetitive.36 It is for this reason that the 
public interest test is described by Reyburn as possessing ‘a “Janus-faced” quality’.37
 
 
In Harmony/Goldfields, it was argued by Goldfields that the words ‘can or 
cannot be justified, found in both sections 12A(1)(a)(ii) and 12A(1)(b), imply that, 
for a merger to be approved, it must be found by the Tribunal that the proposed 
merger is both not anticompetitive and is found to be in favour of the public 
interest.38 The Tribunal correctly refuted this interpretation of the words ‘can or 
cannot’, instead, they submitted that the words simply mean that ‘the public interest 
can have both adverse and benign effects’ in merger evaluation,39 that is, that the 
conclusion on the public interest can either serve to bolster the finding of the 
competition analysis, or cause the Tribunal to prohibit or impose conditions on an 
otherwise competitive merger. The Tribunal further concluded that ‘the public 
interest grounds once evaluated, do not always point to the same net conclusion’ and 
as such the competition authority must carefully balance such grounds so as to 
determine the net conclusion on the public interest.40 It is therefore not necessary for 
all the public interest grounds listed in section 12A(3) to point in the same  direction 
before a merger is either approved, approved with conditions, or rejected on public 
interest considerations,41
 
 instead, a balancing exercise is necessary. 
That the listed public interest considerations may not always point in the same 
direction is somewhat problematic for the competition authorities and as such, a 
procedure was advocated in an earlier case for addressing such situations. In 
Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd42
                                                                    
36 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02 para 214. 
 the 
37 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-93. 
38 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited/Goldfields Limited 93/LM/Nov04 paras 33-34; the 
argument by Goldfields goes as far as to say that even if the merger raises no competition problems or 
public interest problems, the merger must nevertheless be prohibited unless it can be shown that there 
is a net positive public interest gain from the proposed merger. 
39 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited/Goldfields Limited 93/LM/Nov04 para 54. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-93. 
42 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02. 
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Tribunal was explicit in acknowledging the possibility of conflicting public interest 
considerations,43 and as a result, advocated a three-stage approach to be adopted by 
the competition authorities:44
1. Each asserted public interest ground must be considered in isolation and it must be 
determined whether such ground is substantial. 
 
2. If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, and there are at least two contradictory 
grounds, then the competition authority must attempt to reconcile the conflicting grounds. 
3. If the competition authority is unable to reconcile the substantial contradictory grounds, then 
the grounds must be balanced and the competition authority must reach a net conclusion as 
to the public interest.45
This approach both reflects the language of the section and accords with notions of 
common sense. It is patently obvious that public interest grounds may conflict and 
that the same public interest ground, such as the ground of employment, may even be 
invoked for opposing conclusions.
 
46
 
 The three-stage approach of the competition 
authorities to considering public interest grounds is acceptable and non-problematic 
in this regard. 
The wording of section 12A(1) is not clear on the issue of whether the public 
interest must be considered where a merger, if found to be anticompetitive by the 
Tribunal, is nevertheless justified in terms of section 12A(1)(a)(i) as a result of some 
other technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain which outweighs the 
effect or the anticompetitive nature of the merger.47 The word ‘otherwise’, found in 
section 12A(1)(b) would appear to apply only in the instance where the merger is not 
anticompetitive.48 Despite this, the Tribunal has concluded that the public interest 
should be considered even where the merger is justified in terms of section 
12A(1)(a)(i).49
                                                                    
43 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02 paras 
214-215. 
 The Tribunal does not explain its reasoning, however, it appears that 
the Tribunal assumes that there is no sufficient reasoning for the public interest 
44 Ibid at para 217. 
45 In Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02 paras 
221-222, the Tribunal further submitted that a  balancing of public interest grounds will seldom be 
necessary as the ‘conflict’ will more than often involve public interest grounds avoiding each other 
‘like two vehicles bypassing each other in opposite directions on a dual lane road. They pass one 
another without affecting their respective opposite courses’. 
46 Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg Food International Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd 46/LM/May05 paras 
132-133. 
47 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-93. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited/Goldfields Limited 93/LM/Nov04 para 42. 
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evaluation not to take place simply because the merger is only justified in a 
competition analysis in terms of section 12A(1)(a)(i). It is submitted that this 
approach of the authorities is correct; it would clearly not be the intention of the 
legislators to have the word ‘otherwise’ cause such a consequence. 
 
It is clear, therefore, that public interest grounds may either save a proposed 
merger, or prohibit it. It is further clear, however, from a number of judgments by 
the competition authorities, that South African competition law is not primarily 
aimed at protecting the public interest and as such, the competition authorities are 
unlikely to prohibit, based on pure public interest grounds, a merger that is not 
anticompetitive and even less likely to approve an anticompetitive merger, based 
solely upon public interest grounds.50
 
 It appears that the favoured approach of the 
competition authorities in the situation where the net public interest militates against 
the approval of an otherwise not anticompetitive merger is to approve the merger but 
to impose numerous conditions on such approval, aimed at protecting the net public 
interest. A number of such cases will be considered below. 
The process of the competition authorities in merger evaluation is clearly to 
first conduct a competition evaluation, and only once this is complete, conduct a 
public interest evaluation. In the case of Medicross/Prime Cure Holdings,51
the general state of healthcare provisioning in South Africa, the policy objectives of the 
South African government in the realm of healthcare provision, the mechanisms whereby 
government intends achieving those objectives, and the place and role of the private 
sector...
 
however, the Tribunal departed from this approach somewhat. The Tribunal 
commenced its ‘competition analysis’ with a consideration of: 
52
The Tribunal claimed that such considerations fell under the rubric of section 
12A(2)(e)
 
53, however it is plain that such considerations are more in line with the 
public interest than ‘dynamic characteristics of the market’.54
                                                                    
50 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-93. 
 Nevertheless, the 
Tribunal considered these issues in its competition analysis and found, in its very 
51 Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd/Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd 11/LM/Mar05. 
52 Ibid at para 51. 
53 ‘[T]he dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation, and product 
differentiation’. 
54 Competition Act s 12A(2)(e). 
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short public interest analysis, that there were no public interest issues relevant to the 
proposed merger at all.55
It is our view, then, that this extremely fluid context, the absence of an established and stable 
regulatory framework for this embryonic market as well as for some related and long-
standing markets (for example, pharmaceuticals), demands that we adopt a particularly 
cautious and circumspect approach to private interventions, such as this merger, that will 
inevitably impact on the development of the market under consideration. Public interest 
considerations impinging on the outcome of interventions in this area – be they interventions 
by the state, by regulators or by private market participants – are, for unimpeachably good 
reason, unusually intense and this also predisposes us to particular circumspection.
 The Tribunal concluded its segment on the South African 
healthcare environment, as part of its competition analysis by arguing: 
56
Ultimately, the Tribunal did not approve the merger on the ground that it would lead 
to a substantial lessening of competition in the market and there were no 
countervailing technological, efficiency or pro-competitive and no public interest 
considerations in favour of approval.
 
57
 
 
The approach of the Tribunal in the case clearly goes against the established 
two-stage approach adopted in earlier cases. It is unclear why the Tribunal adopted 
this approach in this case, as a plain reading of the Act shows no justification for 
including public interest issues in a competition analysis. It is surprising, in light of 
previous statements by the Tribunal that the public interest is of secondary 
importance, that the Tribunal engaged so thoroughly in public interest issues in a 
competition analysis, and then, rather strangely, did not engage in considering public 
interest issues in its public interest analysis. 
 
The Medicross/Prime Cure Holdings was, however, taken on appeal58 and 
the Competition Appeals Court (CAC) reiterated the traditional two-stage 
approach59
                                                                    
55 Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd/Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd 11/LM/Mar05 para 244. 
: firstly, a competition analysis must be conducted in terms of section 
12A(2), whereby the competition authority must determine whether the merger is 
likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition. The CAC concluded that the 
word ‘likely’ had its prime meaning in ‘probability’ and ‘materially’ meant 
56 Ibid at para 71. 
57 Ibid at para 245. 
58 Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd v Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd (55/CAC/Sep05) [2006] 
ZACAC 3. 
59 Ibid at para 19. 
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‘substantially’,60 this much is obvious. The second stage of the two-stage approach is 
a public interest analysis in terms of the grounds listed in section 12A(3).61
 
 
The CAC found, in no uncertain terms, that the Tribunal was incorrect in its 
consideration of public interest issues in its competition analysis;62
[T]hese issues should have been of no relevance to the first stage of its enquiry which needed 
to examine the evidence relating to the proposed merger’s impact upon competition. These 
public interest considerations would have been more appropriately considered during the 
second phase in terms of section 12A(3), as the need to consider public interest  grounds is a 
separate and subsequent enquiry to that of the primary determination.
 instead, the CAC 
found that the Tribunal should have considered these issues in a secondary public 
interest analysis: 
63
The Tribunal’s decision in Medicross introduced some confusion into the law, 
however, the CAC’s judgment on the correct approach to merger evaluation has 
brought the necessary clarification and rectified the patently incorrect Tribunal 
judgment. 
 
 
The approach of the competition authorities to merger evaluation and the 
public interest is now relatively clear. The two-stage approach is both logical and 
accords primary importance to the principle aim of competition law, the promotion 
and maintenance of competition. The considered cases reveal that the competition 
authorities must be, and have been, firstly and primarily concerned with issues of 
competition., and only subsequently are the authorities to consider issues relating to 
the public interest. This is not to say that the public interest is insignificant, it is only 
to say that issues of the public interest are of secondary importance to issues of 
competition. It must be emphasised again, however, that the preamble and purposes 
of the Competition Act reflect the history and context within which the Act operates. 
To some extent, the South African Act seeks to redress economic injustices of the 
past, and as such, the public interest must play an important role in competition law 
in this country and must be carefully considered by the relevant competition 
authorities. Nevertheless, the established two-stage approach is, it is submitted, the 
                                                                    
60 Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd v Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd (55/CAC/Sep05) [2006] 
ZACAC 3 para 19. 
61 Ibid at paras 19-22. 
62 Ibid at para 24. 
63 Ibid at para 23. 
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correct approach for the South African competition authorities to adopt. It remains, 
now, to consider how the authorities have interpreted and applied the listed public 
interest grounds in section 12A(3), and to assess whether the approach of the 
authorities adequately reflects the purposes of section 2 of the South African 
Competition Act. 
 
5.2 The public interest grounds in merger evaluation 
It is now clear that competition authorities must first conduct a competition 
evaluation and subsequently, a public interest evaluation. Section 12A(3) of the Act 
lists four public interest grounds which must be considered by the competition 
authorities when evaluating a merger. The competition authorities must consider the 
effect the merger will have on: 
(a) a particular industrial sector or region; 
(b) employment; 
(c) the ability of small businesses  ¸ or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and 
(d) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets. 
It is important to note that sections 12A(1)(a)(ii) and 12A(1)(b) make use of the 
words ‘substantial public interest grounds’ (my emphasis), thus, the public interest 
grounds in any particular case will have to have a substantial, or significant, effect if 
they are to lead the competition authorities to a conclusion that is opposite to that of 
the competition analysis. This of course must be the conclusion if primacy is to be 
attached to the competition analysis. 
 
It would appear from the case law that the section 12A(3) list of public 
interest grounds is a numerus clausus of grounds, although this has never been 
explicitly stated by the Competition Tribunal or Competition Appeals Court.64
 
 It 
would nevertheless be absurd for the competition authorities to suggest that there are 
further unexpressed public interest grounds to consider in the delicate realm of 
merger evaluation.  It is also clear that this list of public interest grounds is not 
identical to the public interest purposes listed as part of the objectives section in 
section 2, though, it is clearly very similar in wording and in substance. 
                                                                    
64 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-94. 
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5.2.1 The effect the merger will have upon a particular industrial sector or 
region 
The first public interest ground that the Act requires consideration of is the 
effect the merger will have upon ‘a particular industrial sector or region’.65
The legislature’s use of the word sector here as opposed to the use of the word market, the 
word used in section 12A(2), is instructive. Clearly the legislature intended that in 
undertaking the analysis of the public interest, the competition authorities were to have 
regard to some sphere of economic activity, wider than the mere relevant market, the 
traditional tool of analysis of pure competition law issues.
 The 
Tribunal is clearly of the view that the words ‘sector or region’ are used by the 
legislature as such words are broader in meaning than the word ‘market’, and that 
this is so as to allow for a wider range of issues to be considered in the public 
interest analysis:  
66
 
 
As regards the word ‘industrial’, Reybrun argues that this word should be 
‘interpreted widely to include any sector of economic activity’.67 In the case of 
Nasionale Pers,68 the Tribunal, when considering a merger in the education sector, 
did exactly as suggested by Reyburn, and interpreted the words ‘a particular 
industrial sector’ broadly to encompass issues of education,69 even though the 
education sector is by no means an industrial sector. The Tribunal considered 
education to be a particularly important sector of the South African economy. 
Apartheid policies had left many people ‘unprepared for further education or the 
world of work’, and as a result of South Africa’s historical context, the Tribunal was 
very careful in considering the merger in question.70
 
 
In Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd,71
                                                                    
65 Competition Act s 12A(3)(a). 
 the Tribunal was 
chiefly concerned with the section 12A(3)(c) public interest ground, but did entertain 
Anglo’s argument that, post-merger, Anglo would invest heavily into Kumba, and 
66 Industrial Corporation of South Africa Ltd v Anglo-American Holdings Ltd 25/LM/Jun02 and 
46/LM/Jun02 para 43. 
67 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-95. 
68 Nasionale Pers Ltd/Education Investment Corporation Ltd 45/LM/Apr00. 
69 Ibid at paras 24, 47. 
70 Ibid at para 24. 
71 Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd 46/LM/Jun02. 
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that this would be in the public interest.72 Reyburn argues that, whilst the Tribunal 
did not express under which public interest ground such argument was considered, it 
is probable that it was considered under the ground of ‘the effect the merger will 
have upon a particular industrial sector or region’.73
 
 It is submitted that such 
interpretation may be adopted, however, the Tribunal dealt so briefly with the issue, 
it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from its judgment in this regard. 
In the case of PSG Investment Bank/Real Africa DuroLink,74 the Tribunal 
considered a potential merger between two banks. As part of its public interest 
analysis, the Tribunal considered the harm that may result should Real Africa 
DuroLink (RAB) exit the market.75 Again, it was not stated which public interest 
ground such considerations fell within, however Reyburn argues that it concerned 
the effect the merger would have upon a ‘particular industrial sector’.76
 
 
It appears that the Tribunal has not produced significant jurisprudence 
regarding section 12A(3)(a), however, it is clear that the Tribunal is wary of 
expressing exactly what section 12A(3)(a) entails. The Tribunal’s apparent 
willingness to consider the issue of education and the history of education in South 
Africa indicates that the Tribunal is willing to, as the Act does, look to South 
Africa’s past when approaching competition issues. Such an approach may not be 
necessary in each and every instance of competition law in South Africa, however, at 
least in the case of Nasionale Pers, it was the correct approach to take. The same 
approach as in Nasionale Pers, it is submitted, may potentially be relevant in 
mergers which may substantially affect other public interest issues such as public 
healthcare and housing, although, admittedly, such issues do not necessarily play as 
important a role as education in redressing the economic injustices of the past which 
resulted in a large portion of the population having more limited access to good 
income earning opportunities.  
 
                                                                    
72 Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd 46/LM/Jun02 at paras 141-144. 
73 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-95. 
74 PSG Investment Bank Holdings Ltd/Real Africa Durolink Holdings Ltd 31/LM/May01. 
75 Ibid at paras 8-9. 
76 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-96. 
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Section 12A(3)(a) is framed and interpreted by the Tribunal in more general 
terms than the other public interest grounds listed in section 12A(3). It is submitted 
that the Tribunal is correct in interpreting this ground widely so as to consider issues 
which are not strictly listed in section 12A(3), but are very much in the public 
interest. This is not to say that the Tribunal is given a free license to include any 
public interest issue when considering a merger, it is rather to say that in particular 
cases, certain other public interest issues may be considered in terms of the more 
generally-framed ground of section 12A(3)(a). 
 
The Tribunal’s approach to section 12A(3)(a) in Nasionale Pers reflects how 
this public interest ground should be interpreted and applied in the future. The 
approach is in line with section 2(c) of the Act, that is, ‘to promote employment and 
advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans’ (my emphasis) and in 
line with the preamble which recognises Apartheid policies as causing ‘unjust 
restrictions on full and free participation in the economy by all South Africans’. 
 
5.2.2 The effect the merger will have upon employment 
Secondly, the competition authorities must consider the effect the merger will 
have upon employment.77 This public interest ground is an extremely important 
ground of the public interest in South Africa. The South African context is one 
which exhibits a very high rate of unemployment amongst the general population. In 
1996, the national rate of unemployment was estimated at 40%78 (whilst 42.5% of 
black South Africans were unemployed at the same time). The drafters of the 
Competition Act sought to use the new Act to address this high rate of 
unemployment. Since 1996, and through a variety of means, methods and policies, 
the national unemployment rate has decreased dramatically to an estimated 37% in 
200179 and an estimated 21.7% in 2008.80
                                                                    
77 Competition Act s 12A(3)(b). 
 These figures clearly indicate an 
improvement in employment levels, however, when the present unemployment rate 
78 Statistics South Africa 1996 Census. Census results available at http://www.statssa.gov.za 
[accessed 05 July 2009]. 
79 Statistics South Africa 2001 Census. Census results available at http://www.statssa.gov.za 
[accessed 05 July 2009]. 
80 CIA World Factbook (South Africa). Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/sf.html [accessed 05 July 2009]. 
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of 21.7% is compared to the unemployment rates of developed nations,81
 
 it becomes 
clear that unemployment remains a significant hurdle in South Africa and one that 
still warrants much attention. 
The problem of unemployment is not faced to the same extent in the 
developed nations of the world;82 however, amongst developing countries, and 
especially those in Africa, it is a concern of the highest importance.83
 
 Unemployment 
has many side-effects, including higher crime levels and an increase in harmful drug 
use, and it is no surprise that a society would actively seek to curb a high 
unemployment rate. Furthermore, the long history of oppression by the Apartheid 
government that resulted in a high unemployment rate amongst the black population, 
led employment to become more than a mere economic concern, it has became a 
concern that is intimately linked with freedom and democracy in South Africa. It is 
for these reasons that, when drafting the Competition Act, the drafters did not simply 
seek to copy the legislation of other competition jurisdictions, rather, the drafters of 
the Act sought to incorporate developed competition rules and make additions to 
such rules so as to specifically and uniquely tailor South African competition law to 
suit South Africa. The list of purposes in section 2, for example, was incorporated 
from Canadian law and additions were made to it, one such addition being the 
section 2(c) purpose of promoting employment. It is submitted that the competition 
authorities of South Africa cannot consider the public interest ground of employment 
in merger evaluation in the same manner as the competition authority of some other 
developed country may do, instead, the South African competition authorities should 
pay particular attention to the South African context and recognise that the public 
interest ground of employment is a crucial consideration in merger evaluation in 
South Africa. 
Despite the obvious importance of employment in the South African context, 
the South African competition authorities have expressed their reluctance to interfere 
                                                                    
81 CIA World Factbook (Global Unemployment Ranking Order). Available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html [accessed 05 
July 2009]. 
82 The Canadian unemployment rate, for example is estimated at 6.1%, whilst the unemployment rate 
of the United States of America is an estimated 7.2%. The unemployment rate of the European Union 
is estimated at a slightly higher, 7.5% 
83 The average unemployment rate on the African continent is estimated as high as 21.35%. 
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too much in employment issues at large when evaluating mergers.84 Instead, 
engaging with a host of employment issues such as wages, working conditions and 
collective bargaining,85
[I]t is incumbent on an un-elected, administrative tribunal, principally charged with 
defending and promoting competition, to approach its public interest mandate with great 
circumspection. We derive some comfort from the knowledge that each of the elements of 
public interest that we are obliged to consider are protected and promoted by legislation and 
institutions specifically designed for that purpose – hence, the merged entity would not be 
able to alter unilaterally employment conditions and agreed bargaining arrangements. While 
this cannot provide the basis for us shying away from tough decisions, it does place our own 
role in these matters in correct perspective. At most, our role is ancillary to these other 
statutes and institutions; it is supportive of their general thrust and should, by and large, not 
be employed as a substitute for, and in order to second-guess, these other interventions.
 the Tribunal has held that its role in considering the public 
interest ground of ‘employment’ is secondary to that of those institutions specifically 
designed for, and having the expertise to deal with, the protection of employment 
interests such as these: 
86
 
 
The Tribunal has concluded that the most important rights accorded to 
employees by competition law are procedural: ‘the right to timeous information with 
respect to the potential employment impact of a merger’.87 Section 13A of the Act 
provides that, to ensure that the public interest ground of employment is adequately 
considered, parties to an intermediate or larger merger must notify the Competition 
Commission of such potential merger.88 Furthermore, notice of such potential 
merger must also be given to ‘any registered trade union that represents a substantial 
number of its employees’89 or ‘the employees concerned or representatives of the 
employees concerned, if there are no such registered trade unions’.90
                                                                    
84 Unilever Plc v Competition Commission Ltd 55/LM/Sep01, Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd/Tepco 
Petroleum (Pty) Ltd 66/LM/Oct01, Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited/Stellenbosch Farmers Winery 
Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02. 
 A large or 
intermediate merger will not be implemented until such time as the merger has been 
approved by the Commission, after conducting both a competition and public 
interest analysis. The ground of employment is thus accorded special importance by 
section 13A of the Act, by ensuring employees and their trade unions and/or 
85 Daun et Cie AG/Kolosus Holdings Ltd 10/LM/Mar03 para 125. 
86 Ibid at para 124. 
87 Unilever Plc v Competition Commission 55/LM/Sep01 para 43. 
88 Competition Act s 13A(1). 
89 Competition Act s 13A(2)(a). 
90 Competition Act s 13A(2)(b). 
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representatives are aware of the potential merger, and have the opportunity to make 
submissions to the authorities regarding the merger and its impact upon employment. 
 
To date, the public interest ground of employment has received significant 
attention from the competition authorities. Aside from arguing that the most 
significant rights accorded to employees are procedural, the competition authorities 
have been active in approving mergers, but imposing certain employment-related 
conditions on such approvals. The authorities may also impose employment-related 
conditions upon merger approval that have been agreed by the employees and 
employers themselves.91
 
 
In the case of Daun et Cie/ Kolosus Holdings Limited,92 the Commission 
received submissions from two trade unions (SACTWU and SAFATU), arguing that 
the merger be approved, but with certain conditions upon post-merger employment 
levels and employment conditions. The Tribunal approached the issue of 
employment conditions with much circumspection and did not impose conditions 
upon the merger in this regard,93
However, because of the powerful link between direct employment loss and a restructuring 
initiative like a merger, it is undoubtedly in this area that the legislature intended a role for 
the competition authorities. In contrast then with the other conditions proposed by SACTWU 
we are confident that the Act empowers us to stipulate conditions with respect to the scale of 
job loss occasioned by the merger.
 but did find that in the area of employment levels, 
the Tribunal had a more important role to play: 
94
The Tribunal concluded by approving the merger, on condition that no more than 
150 employees would be retrenched for 12 months post-merger, thus protecting 
employment. 
 
 
The Tribunal is not, however, only concerned with levels of employment 
when considering the public interest ground of employment (although this does 
appear to be their primary concern). In Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v 
                                                                    
91 Cherry Creek Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd/Northwest Star (Pty) Ltd 52/LM/Jul04; Multichoice Subscriber 
Management (Pty) Ltd v Tiscali 72/LM/Sep04. 
92 Daun et Cie AG/Kolosus Holdings Ltd 10/LM/Mar03. 
93 Ibid at para 125. 
94 Ibid at para 126. 
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Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group,95 the Tribunal noted that there would be a 
large number of  job losses should the merger be approved, however, the Tribunal 
appears to have been more concerned with the effect the merger would have upon 
employment as a whole. As a result, the Tribunal paid particular attention to the 
question of whether retrenchment packages in this case were sufficient and whether 
they were properly negotiated.96
 
 
It is evident that the Tribunal is very wary of engaging too deeply with 
employment issues when analysing a merger. The Tribunal prefers to concern itself 
only with levels of employment post-merger. The Tribunal has, however, softened its 
stance by insisting that its concern is the ‘substantial effect on employment’97 by the 
merger and not merely job losses. The Tribunal has further held that the effect of a 
large number of job losses may be ameliorated by offering adequate retrenchment 
packages to retrenched employees.98
 
 
In the above discussed Tribunal cases, argument largely surrounded potential 
job losses of unskilled and semi-skilled employees of one or the other merging 
parties. In the case of Harmony Gold Mining Co/Goldfields Ltd,99 however, the 
Tribunal discussed job losses of skilled persons. The Tribunal was clearly of the 
opinion that job losses of managerial positions and skilled labour were less serious 
than that of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, as skilled workers are considered 
more marketable and more likely to obtain alternative employment should they be 
retrenched as a result of the merger.100
 
 
The conditions that are imposed by the authorities, however, are most often 
only imposed for a relatively short period of time. The authorities are aware that the 
nature of a merger most often results in job cuts so as to realise the potential 
efficiency gains. In the case of DB Investments SA v De Beers,101
                                                                    
95 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02. 
 the Tribunal 
disagreed with the trade unions’ argument that the approval of the merger would 
96 Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02 at paras 
242-243. 
97 Ibid at para 242. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited/Goldfields Limited 93/LM/Nov04. 
100 Ibid at paras 89-91. 
101 DB Investments SA v De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited 20/LM/Mar01. 
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have an adverse effect upon employment The Tribunal further expressed the view 
that to impose long-term conditions is illogical: 
It is furthermore illogical and impractical to expect employers to offer undertakings with 
regard to maintaining employment levels into the distant future, especially having regard to 
the dynamic and volatile nature of the relevant industries.102
 
 
The competition authorities, whilst seeking to balance a competition analysis 
with a public interest analysis, are careful not to impose, in the instance of 
employment, conditions which are so onerous upon the merging companies that they 
do damage to long-term efficiency gains and competition gains that would be 
achieved through the merger. It appears most common for the competition 
authorities to impose conditions on merger approval which ensure that no more than 
a stipulated number of jobs may be cut in a 12 month period. Such an approach, it is 
submitted, is the correct approach. To impose long-term employment conditions 
upon merger approval may fundamentally do damage to the merger. If the authorities 
would seek to impose long-term conditions, then it is submitted that it would be 
better for the Tribunal to reject the merger on public interest grounds. 
 
The rejection of a merger purely upon the public interest ground is, however, 
unlikely. As stated previously, the authorities are reluctant to reject any merger that 
is not anticompetitive based upon any ground of the public interest. The authorities 
prefer to impose conditions upon merger approval if the merger is found to be 
competitive. 
 
It is submitted that this approach by the competition authorities to the public 
interest ground of employment is, in general, the correct approach. Institutions such 
as the Labour Relations Act, Employment Equity Act, trade unions and the like, have 
been specifically created and designed to protect the interests of both employees and 
employers. It would surely be both unwise and unreasonable to expect a competition 
authority, which is an unelected body primarily concerned with promoting and 
maintaining competition, to play a primary role in issues associated with 
employment. True as the approach of the competition authorities may be, however, 
the competition authorities cannot ‘shy away’ from this ground. The authorities 
                                                                    
102 DB Investments SA v De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited 20/LM/Mar01 at para 40. 
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must, in light of the South African context of unemployment, devote significant 
attention to the levels of employment associated with proposed mergers. 
 
As the Tribunal has done in the past, more care must be had when a merger 
involves job cuts of unskilled and semi-skilled persons. Such persons, as a result of 
South Africa’s Apartheid history, were most likely forced into such occupation as a 
result of limited access of movement and limited access to education. The Tribunal 
must be commended for its approach in this regard. It is submitted, however, that it 
is foreseeable that there may be mergers in the future which may lead to substantial 
job losses, perhaps even causing job losses in small communities and towns which 
are dependent on such employment. In these instances, it is difficult to imagine 
imposing a mere 12-month condition of maintaining employment levels upon the 
merger. In these instances, it is submitted, the competition authorities should not shy 
away from rejecting otherwise not anticompetitive mergers on public interest 
grounds. The ground of employment is imperative in South Africa and, in 
exceptional cases, the competition authorities may be required to protect the public 
interest for periods of time longer than 12 months. 
 
5.2.3 The effect the merger will have upon the ability of small businesses or 
firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to be 
competitive 
Thirdly, the competition authorities must consider the effect the merger will 
have on ‘the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive’.103
                                                                    
103 Competition Act s 12A(3)(c). 
 Much like the public interest 
ground of promoting employment, this ground has particular importance in South 
Africa. It is common cause that the Apartheid history of South Africa led to an 
excessive concentration of the economy in the hands of the white population. Whilst 
the Apartheid regime has since ended, the results of the Apartheid economic system 
are still being experienced today, some fifteen years after South Africa transitioned 
to a democratic Republic. It is clear from both the preamble and section 2(f) of the 
Competition Act that one of the key functions of the Competition Act is to address 
this problem by promoting a greater spread of ownership in the South African 
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economy, especially amongst the historically disadvantaged portion of the 
population.104
 
 It is submitted that careful attention must be paid to this public interest 
ground by South Africa’s competition authorities – it is not merely a general public 
interest consideration common to all societies and competition regimes; rather, it is a 
consideration that is particularly relevant to the South African context. Should the 
South African competition authorities seek, at least in some manner, to lessen and 
eradicate the effects of the Apartheid economic system, it is submitted that this 
public interest ground should be carefully weighed. 
Historically disadvantaged persons (or ‘HDPs’) are defined in the 
Competition Act in the following manner: 
For all purposes of this Act, a person is a historically disadvantaged person if that person - 
(a) is one of a category of individuals who, before the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993), came into operation, were disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination on the basis of race; 
(b) is an association, a majority of whose members are individuals referred to in paragraph (a); 
(c) is a juristic person other than an association, and individuals referred to in paragraph (a) own 
and control a majority of its issued share capital or members’ interest and are able to control 
a majority of its votes; or 
(d) is a juristic person or association, and persons referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) own and 
control a majority of its issued share capital or members’ interest and are able to control a 
majority of its votes.105
This definition is by no means problematic and it is clear that the Act seeks to 
address the interests of persons who specifically suffered under, and as a result of, 
Apartheid racial discrimination. It is for this reason that this public interest ground is 
especially relevant in South Africa. The South African situation is different to that of 
the United States, where the portion of the population that suffered from 
government-enforced racial discrimination was a small minority. In South Africa, 
historically disadvantaged persons constitute the overwhelming majority of the 
general population and, as such, their interests require special consideration. 
 
 
The Tribunal has addressed this section 12A(3)(c) public interest ground in 
relatively few cases, though significant attention was paid to this ground in the case 
                                                                    
104 See Competition Act preamble and s 2(f). 
105 Competition Act s 3(2). 
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of Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd.106
 
 In this case, Anglo 
American sought to merge with Kumba Resources and such merger was found to not 
be anticompetitive by the Tribunal. The Tribunal then conducted a public interest 
analysis in terms of section 12A(1)(b) where arguments primarily involved the 
public interest ground of section 12A(3)(c). 
In the aforementioned case, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
intervened and argued that, in light of the preamble and section 2(f) of the Act, 
which clearly aims at promoting a greater spread of ownership in the economy, 
especially amongst historically disadvantaged persons, a purposive interpretation of 
section 12A(3)(c) should be adopted.107 The IDC argued that Anglo American, a 
traditional firm in the mining sector, already possessed a ‘lion’s share of the 
economy’ and that to approve the merger with Kumba, a strategic asset in the iron 
ore mining industry, would concentrate ownership in the economy in white hands 
and thus achieve nothing less than the exact opposite of the intent of the preamble.108 
As such, the IDC argued that the proposed merger should be approved, but subject to 
certain strict conditions so as to ensure the continued involvement of historically 
disadvantaged persons in the ownership and control of Kumba.109
 
 
The Tribunal did not decide whether the wide purposive interpretation of 
section 12A(3)(c), as advocated by the IDC, was the correct approach to be adopted, 
however the Tribunal did decide that the merger could not be prohibited on this basis 
alone. The Tribunal found that there was insufficient evidence of an alternative bid 
by historically disadvantaged persons, to that of Anglo American’s, for control of 
Kumba,110 and that to prohibit the merger on the possibility of a later offer from a 
HDP owned and controlled firm, would be pure speculation.111 The Tribunal 
furthermore concluded that there was ‘insufficient evidence to suggest that if the 
merger is implemented it would close the door on increasing the ownership of HDPs 
in Kumba’.112
                                                                    
106 Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd 46/LM/Jun02. 
 
107 Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd 46/LM/Jun02 at paras 147-151. 
108 Ibid at para 153. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid at para 161. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd 46/LM/Jun02 para 167. 
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The proposed purposive interpretation of section 12A(3)(c), despite being 
entertained by the Tribunal, was not endorsed, on the contrary, the Tribunal chose to, 
rather vaguely, state that they neither endorsed nor refuted the correctness of the 
approach argued for by the IDC, nor did the depart from earlier decisions on the 
approach to the public interest grounds of section 12A(3): 
It is important to note that in adopting the IDC’s approach in interpreting the legislation we 
have done no more than to evaluate whether, if that approach was found to be the correct 
one, there is evidence on the record to support prohibiting the merger on the basis that on a 
preponderance of probabilities it would frustrate the objects of the Competition Act the IDC 
seeks to invoke. We have found that the evidence does not establish this. This does not mean 
that we endorse this approach as the correct interpretation of the Act or that we have 
departed from our earlier decisions on the application of the public interest. We deem it 
imprudent to make a decision on so difficult an issue when the outcome of such a debate 
would be academic given our conclusions on the evidence.113
In making this argument, the Tribunal referenced three important large merger cases 
where the application of the public interest was relevant.
 
114 This paper now turns to 
consider the judgment of the Tribunal in one these cases, Shell South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd/Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd,115
 
 in order to try to determine the approach of the 
Tribunal to interpreting and applying the public interest ground related to historically 
disadvantaged persons. 
In Shell South Africa/Tepco Petroleum, the Tribunal rejected the argument 
advanced by the Competition Commission and instead chose to approve the merger 
between Shell South Africa and Tepco Petroleum without condition. Tepco and 
Shell SA sought to merge, the result of which would see Shell SA gain ownership 
and control over Tepco and would see Thebe,116
                                                                    
113 Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd 46/LM/Jun02 at para 170, also see para 167. 
 the black economic empowerment 
company and controlling shareholder of Tepco, acquiring a 17.5% share in Shell SA 
Marketing, the post-merger company which will control the assets and trademarks of 
Tepco. The Competition Commission argued for the imposition of three conditions 
on the approval of such merger on the grounds that the merger between Tepco and 
114 Unilever plc/Robertsons Foods (Pty) Ltd 55/LM/Sep01, Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd/Tepco 
Petroleum (Pty) Ltd 66/LM/Oct01, Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited/Stellenbosch Farmers Winery 
Group Ltd 08/LM/Feb02. 
115 Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd/Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd 66/LM/Oct01. 
116 Thebe Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd. 
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Shell SA would result in ownership and control passing out of the hands of 
historically disadvantaged persons. The Commission’s argument thus revolved 
around the importance in this merger, of the section 12A(3)(c) public interest ground 
of protecting the ability of firms owned by historically disadvantaged persons to 
become competitive. 
 
In its judgment, the Tribunal analysed each condition argued for by the 
Commission, individually, and found that Tepco was a small, isolated company with 
little chance of sustainable growth, and that ensuring the prolonged life of this 
company would do little to further empowerment in South Africa: 
 
Empowerment is not furthered by obliging firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons to 
continue to exist on a life support machine.117
 
 
The Tribunal further found that the merging parties eagerly sought to merge and that 
such merger would not result in Thebe exiting the market, rather, Thebe would 
acquire a 17.5% share in Shell SA Marketing, the company which would control 
Tepco’s assets post-merger. The Commission also sought to impose conditions on 
the merger which would see the continued existence of Tepco in the market and 
Tepco’s brand.118
 
 Such conditions, however, were also rejected by the Tribunal and 
the merger approved without condition. 
The Tribunal is clearly of the view that the imposition of conditions upon 
mergers simply in order to prolong the involvement of historically disadvantaged 
persons in a particular market, especially where such a merger may be found to be 
not anticompetitive and commercially justifiable to such persons, steers dangerously 
close to the authorities overstepping their mandate and, possibly, causing damage to 
the very interests they are to protect.119
                                                                    
117 Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd/Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd 66/LM/Oct01 para 42. 
 Whilst the competition authorities are tasked 
with promoting competition and guarding, at least to some extent, the public interest, 
they are not tasked with intervening in mergers to the extent argued for by the 
Commission in the case of Shell South Africa/Tepco Petroleum. 
118 The third condition suggested by the Commission was that the any shareholder agreement pursuant 
to the other conditions must first be submitted to the Commission for approval before being 
implemented. Such a condition, however, has little relevance to the public interest ground relating to 
historically disadvantaged persons, and the Tribunal was correct in dismissing this condition. 
119 Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd/Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd 66/LM/Oct01 para 58. 
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The public interest ground of employment, as already articulated, may cause 
a merger to be approved with conditions or even cause an otherwise competitive 
merger to be rejected in its entirety because of employment concerns (although the 
South African authorities are ordinarily not in favour of this approach). It is 
submitted, however, that the public interest ground relating to historically 
disadvantaged persons cannot be interpreted and applied in the same manner. The 
ground of employment revolves around the reality that mergers often result in job 
losses of persons in the employment of either of the merging firms, whereas the 
ground relating to historically disadvantaged persons concerns the wider community, 
not only the merging firms themselves. 
 
It is submitted that this ground should largely operate as a ground to reject an 
otherwise competitive merger on public interest grounds or serve to approve a 
merger that is otherwise deemed anticompetitive (although this possibility is very 
unlikely, given the previous statements of the competition authorities). This ground 
may also operate in conditional form, but only in a manner which may facilitate the 
ability of other small businesses and firms owned by HDPs, to be competitive. The 
concern is therefore not for the merging HDP firm, but the effect such merger will 
have upon other HDP firms in the market. 
 
The reasons for such an argument are as follows: Where an HDP firm seeks 
to merge with a non-HDP firm and where such merger is not anticompetitive and 
such merger is commercially justifiable, it goes against underlying capitalist notions 
to impose conditions on such merger, requiring the continued existence of the HDP 
firm’s name or brand, simply in the name of ensuring the involvement of historically 
disadvantaged persons in a market. Not only may the HDP firm be a perfectly 
willing seller,120 but the merger may be vital for the HDP firm’s continued existence 
in other markets.121
 
 Derailment of the merger may thus, far from protecting HDPs, 
result in more damage to the ability of historically disadvantaged persons to be 
competitive. 
                                                                    
120 Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd/Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd 66/LM/Oct01 para 53. 
121 Ibid at para 42. 
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It is submitted that this public interest ground should instead operate so as 
exclude mergers found to be not anticompetitive, but that are detrimental to the 
ability of other small businesses or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to be competitive. This is currently not the approach of the 
competition authorities, however, it appears that this is how section 12A(3)(c) is 
designed to operate. 
 
The case of Shell South Africa/Tepco Petroleum demonstrates that the 
emphasis in assessing this condition should not be upon the interests of the HDP 
firm which seeks to merge, but upon other HDP firms in the relevant market. It is 
these other HDP firms which may suffer as a result of the merger, whereas the HDP 
firm seeking to merge without condition should be entitled to do exactly that. The 
Commission further argued that what is good for Thebe may not necessarily be good 
for the broader South African interest, however this argument was rejected by the 
Tribunal by re-stating the view that: 
[t]he competition authorities, however well intentioned, are well advised not to pursue their 
public interest mandate in an over-zealous manner lest they damage precisely those interests 
that they ostensibly seek to protect.122
 
 
The public interest ground of section 12A(3)(c) is not a free license for the 
competition authorities to intervene in commercial decisions,123
                                                                    
122 Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd/Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd 66/LM/Oct01 para 58. 
 instead, it operates 
so as to protect the ability of small businesses or firms controlled or owned by 
historically disadvantaged persons, to be competitive. The concern is with ensuring 
the South African economy is open to greater ownership by a greater number of 
South Africans, not forcing certain South Africans to remain in the market simply 
because they are historically disadvantaged. It still remains to be seen whether the 
courts will attach a purposive interpretation to section 12A(3)(c). Whilst this public 
interest ground has been interpreted in a manner which seeks to prevent HDP-
controlled firms from exiting a market, it should be interpreted in a manner which 
assess whether the proposed merger will cause the ability of other small businesses 
and firms controlled by historically disadvantaged persons to be competitive, to be 
greatly diminished. 
123 Ibid at para 50. 
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5.2.4 The effect the merger will have upon the ability of national industries to 
compete in international markets 
Finally, the competition authorities must consider the effect the merger will 
have on ‘the ability of national industries to compete in international markets’. 124
 
 
Unlike the grounds of employment and the ability of firms controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons to be competitive, this public interest ground is not intimately 
linked with South Africa’s apartheid history to the extent that the historically 
disadvantaged community are directly affected, rather, the Apartheid regime resulted 
in sanctions which limited the ability of all South Africans to compete in 
international markets. To this extent then, this ground is important, however, it is 
submitted, given South Africa’s steady emergence out of the pit of Apartheid, not as 
important as it may have been over the past ten years Thus, whilst this ground 
demands attention, it does not, it is submitted, have as important a role in South 
Africa today as do the grounds of sections 12A(3)(b) and (c). 
The Tribunal’s approach to this ground is well articulated in Tongaat-Hulett 
Group Ltd/Transvaal Suiker Bpk.125 In this case, after finding that the merger would 
be anticompetitive, the Tribunal assessed whether the merger could nevertheless be 
approved on public interest grounds. The Tribunal, in considering section 12A(3)(d), 
found that dominance of a local market was not necessary for the merged entity to 
compete internationally, instead, the Tribunal found that local competition enhances 
international competition.126 The Tribunal is thus clearly of the view that the size of 
the firm is not conclusive, effectiveness is, and thus the Tribunal will not approve an 
anticompetitive merger where size of production and effectiveness does not 
increase.127 The link between this public interest ground and traditional competition 
law concerns of efficiency, in this regard, are clear.128
 
 
This public interest ground will more likely be invoked where parties seek 
the approval of an otherwise anticompetitive merger. The concern in such instances 
is not the social welfare of employees, or ability of previous marginalised portions of 
                                                                    
124 Competition Act s 12A(3)(d). 
125 Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited/Transvaal Suiker Bpk 83/LM/Jul00. 
126 Ibid at para 116. 
127 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-99. As articulated earlier, the Tribunal has displayed its unwillingness to 
approve an anticompetitive merger, despite the force of the public interest arguments. 
128 Reyburn (note 4) at 10-99. 
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the population to compete, rather, the concern is with the international competition 
ability of larger firms. Such a concern must not, however, be disregarded. In the case 
of Nampak Ltd/Malbak Ltd,129 the Tribunal did not decide upon the force of the 
public interest argument, but did concede that business with multi-national 
corporations was of significant importance to the merging parties.130 It is possible to 
imagine an instance where an anticompetitive merger between a failing firm 
(operating in a primarily international product market) and another firm (operating in 
a primarily local product market) may be approved in terms of this public interest 
ground. It must still be noted, however, that the authorities are weary of attempts 
relying on the failing firm doctrine.131
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                    
129 Nampak Ltd/Malbak Ltd 29/LM/May02. 
130 Ibid at paras 63-65. 
131 See Tiger Brands Ltd/Langeberg Food International Ashton Canning Co (Pty) Ltd 46/LM/May05. 
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6. EXEMPTIONS ON PUBLIC INTEREST GROUNDS 
Aside from preamble, purposes section and section 12A relating to merger 
control, the only other express reference to the public interest in the South African 
Competition Act is found in section 10(3), which relates to the granting of 
exemptions by the Competition Commission in terms of section 10(2)(a) of certain 
agreements or practices that are otherwise restricted by the Act. Section 10(3) does 
not allow for the granting of exemptions based on the general public interest, 
however it does allow for the granting of exemptions based upon four narrowly 
circumscribed public interest objectives,132
(i) maintenance or promotion of exports; 
 namely: 
(ii) promotion of the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; 
(iii) change in productive capacity necessary to stop decline in an industry; or 
(iv) the economic stability of any industry designated by the Minister, after consulting the 
Minister responsible for that industry. 
Unlike merger control, it is the prerogative of a firm to apply to the Competition 
Commission for an exemption. Furthermore, an applicant must show that the 
granting of an exemption is ‘required to attain an objective mentioned in paragraph 
(b)’133 or if such exemption ‘contributes to’134 the list of public interest objectives 
listed in section 10(3)(b).  Even if an applicant is able to show this, however, it is 
still the prerogative of the Commission to grant the exemption.135
 
 Clearly, the Act 
envisages that in some circumstances, competition may not be the highest objective, 
but the public interest may be, and it is for this reason that exemptions exist. Each of 
these public interest grounds upon which exemptions may be granted will be briefly 
considered below.  
6.1 Maintenance or promotion of exports 
The first of these exemptions is that agreements or practices may be 
exempted on the ground that they maintain or promote exports.136
                                                                    
132 Reyburn (note 4) at 5-83. 
 This objective is 
similar in wording to that of the section 12A(3)(d) public interest merger 
133 Competition Act s 10(3)(a). 
134 Competition Act s 10(3)(b). 
135 Competition Act s 10(3) ‘The Competition Commission may grant an exemption in terms of 
subsection 2(a) on if – ’ (my emphasis).  
136 Competition Act s 10(3)(b)(i). 
Un
ive
sit
y o
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
43 
 
consideration of ‘the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets’.137 Reyburn argues that the jurisprudence concerning section 12A(3)(d) 
may thus be relevant in interpreting section 10(3)(b)(i) in the future, and, that like the 
merger ground, the competition authorities will be wary of allowing this exemption 
at the cost of unnecessary exploitation of the local market.138
 
 
South Africa suffered from the imposition of sanctions by the international 
community during the Apartheid regime. One result of such sanctions was limited 
participation by South Africans in world markets. The Competition Act seeks to 
address this in section 2 by providing that one purpose of the Act is to ‘expand 
opportunities for South African participation in world markets and recognise the role 
of foreign competition in the Republic’.139
 
 It appears that the public interest 
objective to maintain or promote exports, is aligned with this purpose of the Act, and 
as such, should not be too easily disregarded by the competition authorities. 
Without negating the importance of this public interest objective in the realm 
of exemptions, it is submitted that such an exemption is not particular to South 
Africa nor is it particular to developing nations – it is an exemption which may be 
found in the competition laws of numerous jurisdictions. It is nevertheless important 
for developing nations, in growing their fledgling economies, to be involved to some 
extent in world markets. If maintaining or promoting exports will lead to large 
enhancements of the public interest, it thus is submitted that in developing nations, 
this exemption may be very important. 
 
6.2 Promotion of the ability of small businesses, or firms 
controlled by historically disadvantaged persons, to become 
competitive 
The second objective is identical in wording to the public interest merger 
ground listed in section 12A(3).140
                                                                    
137 Reyburn (note 4) at 5-83. 
 As with that public interest ground, it is submitted 
that the South African context determines that this exemption ground is of particular 
138 Ibid; Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited/Transvaal Suiker Bpk 83/LM/Jul00 para 116. 
139 Competition Act s 2(d). 
140 Competition Act s 12A(3)(c). 
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importance. Eleanor Fox has argued that, whilst South Africa’s competition law is 
largely reflective of well-tested principles of competition law, this public interest 
exemption ground represents ‘unchartered territory’ in competition law.141
 
  
Despite the new nature of this exemption, it continues reflect the traditional 
aim of competition law in that such an exemption may only be granted to the 
specified parties, if it aids in their ‘ability...to become competitive’ (my emphasis). 
The exemption clearly cannot be granted to parties simply because they fall within 
the definition of a ‘small business’ or ‘historically disadvantaged person’, rather, it 
may only be granted if such exemption is applied for by a qualifying party and will 
aid in such party, or parties, to become competitive, that is, ‘more efficient and 
effective in the marketplace’.142 Fox is unsure as to where such an exemption is 
likely to find application, as most anti-competitive agreements will not aid parties in 
becoming competitive, although she concedes that it may find application in ‘the 
gray area within which the competitive effects of an agreement are ambiguous’. 143
 Firstly, some agreements or practices may, despite being per se prohibited, be 
pro-competitive. Reyburn argues that such agreements or practices may well 
be exempted from the strict requirements of the Act.
 
Reyburn, however, finds that this exemption may well apply in two instances: 
144
 Secondly, Reyburn concedes to Fox’s argument, that anticompetitive 
agreements will not likely cause firms to become competitive, but argues that 
the standard of what amounts to a pro-competitive gain under section 10 may 
well not be as exacting as for section 4(1)(a). In such instances, Reyburn 
argues that, in such instances, the competition authorities may well allow an 
exemption.
 
145
This exemption may still play an important role in South African competition law; 
however, its exact role is far from certain. 
 
 
Despite the uncertainty as to the application of this exemption, it remains 
reflective of both the preamble and purposes of the Competition Act. Such an 
                                                                    
141 E.M Fox ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Competition law: Lessons from and for South Africa and 
Indonesia’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 579 at 585-586. 
142 Ibid at 587. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Reyburn (note 4) at 5-84. 
145 Ibid. 
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exemption is not, as Fox articulates, common to well-tested principles of competition 
law, however, it may find some application in South Africa. It is clear that this 
ground for exemption is specifically targeted at redressing the problems caused by 
Apartheid by allowing HDPs and SMEs some potential liberty in their compliance 
with the provisions of the Act, with the direct aim that they may become competitive 
in the future. It is obvious that the granting of such an exemption would only operate 
in the short term, as long term exemptions would most likely do more harm to 
competition than they would do to promote the ability of SMEs and HDPs to become 
competitive. Nevertheless, the application of this ground remains uncertain in South 
Africa. 
 
6.3 Change in productive capacity necessary to stop decline in an 
industry 
Ordinarily, where there is a decline in demand, competition in a market will 
lead to the most inefficient firm exiting such market and result in a return to balance 
between supply and demand, and thus, efficient firms will continue to supply the 
demand.146 This may not, however, always be the case. Where factors of production 
are not mobile, considerable hardship will result and exit from the market by firms 
will often lead to reduced competition. It is for this reason that this exemption has 
been designed.147 The exemption allows competitors to co-operate for the purposes 
of reducing output, which would otherwise be prohibited under the Act, so as to stop 
decline in an industry. Although the Act does not specify that any requirements be 
met under this exemption, Reyburn suggests four prerequisites before the 
Commission grants an exemption based upon this ground:148
 Overcapacity must not be temporary; 
 
 Restrictions will have to be temporary; 
 An agreement will have to show clearly how the co-operating firms intend to 
reduce capacity. Restrictions on output are not the same as provisions to 
reduce capacity. 
                                                                    
146 Reyburn (note 4) at 5-85. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid at 5-85, 5-86. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
46 
 
 Restrictions on competition will have to relate to the attempt to reduce 
capacity. Section 10 will apply only if the agreement or practice 
“contributes” to one of the listed objectives and the restriction in necessary to 
attain the objective. 
  
This exemption ground does not seem to be particular to the South African 
context, or even that of developing countries. Such a provision for exemption aims to 
prevent decline in an industry, an issue which may be of concern not only to 
developing nations, but to all nations and economies. An exemption based upon this 
public interest objectives does not seek to address the injustices caused by Apartheid, 
rather, it seems to reflects the first purpose of the Act, in section 2(a), that is, ‘to 
promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy’ (my 
emphasis). This ground for exemption appears to aid in the future development of 
the economy (and in turn, benefit the public interest) of South Africa by temporarily 
allowing illegal cartel activity which restricts output, so as to prevent decline in an 
industry. As argued by Reyburn, the authorities will not likely allow an exemption 
on this ground if there are less restrictive mean by which to achieve the objective.149
 
 
The recent exposure of a number of cartels operative in the South African economy, 
and the overwhelmingly negative reaction to such cartel behaviour by the 
competition authorities, academia and the media only serves to deter the 
Commission from allowing an exemption under this public interest ground.  
Nevertheless, the objective may, in some instances, lead to exemptions from 
prohibited practices under the Act. 
6.4 The economic stability of any industry designated by the 
Minister, after consulting the Minister responsible for that industry 
Finally, section 10(3)(b)(iv) provides that an exemption from the provisions 
of Chapter 2 of the Act may be granted if it contributes to the economic stability of 
an industry designated by the Minister responsible for that industry. It is submitted 
that the arguments relating to section 10(3)(b)(iii) are equally relevant in regard to 
this provision – it does not reflect the specific interests of South Africa or developing 
countries, rather it is a provision which may be common to all nations.  
                                                                    
149 Reyburn (note 4) at 5-86. 
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Despite not being particular to South Africa or developing nations, the two broad 
approaches to this ground will be outlined below. The approaches are wide and 
narrow.150
 
 The wide approach, which is more difficult to justify on the wording of 
the provision, insists that an exemption may be granted for any agreement between 
competitors, if regulation is necessary to the proper functioning of the industry. In 
terms of the narrow approach to section 10(3)(b)(iv), however, only fluctuations in 
supply and demand merit an exemption. It is unclear which approach should be 
adopted in South Africa, however, it should be remembered that the aim of such an 
objective is not to protect competitors, but to contribute to the economic stability of 
an industry, which aids in protecting the public interest. 
 
 
  
                                                                    
150 Reyburn (note 4) at 5-86. 
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7. HOW IMPORTANT IS THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST IN COMPETITION LAW? 
Before engaging in a consideration of the importance of the public interest in 
competition law, it must be borne in mind that according too important a role to the 
public interest in competition law would in fact undermine the very purpose of 
competition law. Competition law does not exist to pander to considerations of the 
public interest; rather, its roots are in economic theory and it exists, primarily, to 
promote efficiency and consumer welfare. So long as the importance of the core of 
competition law remains intact, laws may justifiably vary, according differing levels 
of importance to the public interest. This section will briefly explore the role of 
public interest objectives in competition law and the importance of such objectives in 
the competition laws of South Africa and developing countries. 
 
The approach of the United States toward the objectives of competition law, 
after over a century of jurisprudence, is boldly clear – it is the view of the Antitrust 
Division that the promotion of economic efficiency and maximisation of consumer 
welfare, are the only appropriate objectives of US antitrust law.151
 
 In the United 
States then, which is arguably one of the most developed countries of the world, the 
public interest has no role to play in competition law. This represents the farthest 
view hostile toward considering the public interest in competition law, though it is 
not a view shared by all competition jurisdictions. 
The 2003 OECD Global Forum on Competition provides much perspective 
as to the role of the public interest in various OECD and non-OECD competition 
jurisdictions. Prior to the Forum, questionnaires concerning the objectives of 
competition law and policy were issued to participating states, and the results of 
these questionnaires were summarised in the Note by the Secretariat.152
                                                                    
151 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Questionnaire on the 
Objectives of Competition Law and Policy and the Optimal Design of a Competition Agency (United 
States) OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003. Available at 
 The results 
of the questionnaire shed much light upon the role accorded to the public interest in 
developed and developing countries. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/62/2486358.pdf [accessed 10 November 2009]. 
152 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Objectives of 
Competition Law and Policy (Note by Secretariat) OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/39/2486329.pdf [accessed 25 September 2009]. 
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Firstly, it is notable that, among OECD countries, there is a shift by 
competition regulators toward placing less emphasis on, and relying less frequently 
upon, public interest objectives, where they exist in domestic law. Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that no jurisdiction has changed their law so as to insert public interest 
objectives into domestic law. This indicates a move back toward traditional 
objectives of competition law.153 Secondly, however, it is evident that the shift away 
from using competition law to further the public interest, is a trend that is common to 
many jurisdictions, but only once they have achieved a certain level of economic 
development.154 A consideration of the competition laws of developing countries, 
however, reveals that, particularly in the area of merger control, public interest 
objectives are widely embraced.155
 
 This indicates that public interest objectives are 
considered, at least in the realm of merger control, integral to competition law in 
developing countries. 
David Lewis, former Chairperson of the South African Competition Tribunal, 
has conceded that, for two reasons, ‘public interest considerations weigh more 
heavily in developing countries than they do in developed countries’.156 These 
reasons are, firstly, that it is well recognised that there is greater role to be played by 
targeting support to strategically selected interest groups in developing countries 
rather than developed countries. Secondly, the competition authorities of developing 
countries are engaged in ‘a very basic struggle to achieve credibility and 
legitimacy’.157
                                                                    
153 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Objectives of 
Competition Law and Policy (Note by Secretariat) OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003 at 3. 
Available at 
 When considering South Africa’s context, Lewis concedes that 
balancing competition and the public interest is not an easy task, but argues that, in 
light of South Africa’s socio-economic context, if public interest considerations such 
as employment and black economic empowerment were not at all considered, both 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/39/2486329.pdf [accessed 25 September 2009]. 
154 Ibid at 4. 
155 Ibid. The list of countries which fall under this rubric include Brazil, Cameroon, Gabon, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Macedonia, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, Chinese Taipei, Tunisia, Ukraine 
and Zambia. 
156 D Lewis ‘The Role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation’ International Competition Network: 
Merger Working Group (28-29 September 2002). Available at 
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/lewis5.pdf [accessed 1 September 2009]. 
157 Ibid. 
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the Competition Act and the competition authorities would be consigned to the 
‘scrap-heap’ by the public.158
 
  
Perhaps the best summary as to the confusing role of the public interest in the 
competition laws of developing countries, as compared to developed countries, is 
provided by David Lewis when concluding his response to the 2003 OECD Global 
Forum on Competition questionnaire as regards the objectives of competition law 
and policy in South Africa: 
In summary then, developing countries will insist on seeking a balance between competition 
law and policy, on the one hand, and industrial policy, on the other. They will insist, in other 
words, on attempting to meet both sets of objectives. The overall micro-economic policy 
framework will be provided by an active competition policy and competition law directed at 
imposing market disciplines on both public and private concentrations of economic power 
and by an active industrial policy which will continue to be deployed as the preferred 
mechanism for achieving selective economic and social policy goals. Just as European 
farmers and US steelworkers will in occasional, though important, instances, tilt the scales 
against competition policy in those jurisdictions, so will pressing economic and social 
problems in developing countries, ensure similar compromises. The textbooks will continue 
to find this inelegant, but the real world demands it.159
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                    
158 D Lewis ‘The Role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation’ International Competition Network: 
Merger Working Group (28-29 September 2002). Available at 
http://www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/lewis5.pdf [accessed 1 September 2009]. 
159 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Questionnaire on the 
Objectives of Competition Law and Policy and the Optimal Design of a Competition Agency (South 
Africa) OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/59/2486466.pdf [accessed 10 November 2009]. 
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8. COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
The approach to competition law in the developed world is without doubt 
angled toward efficiency and consumer welfare.160 The approach to competition law 
in developing countries, however, need not be exactly the same. Eleanor Fox argues 
that efficiency remains an important goal, however, some goals may be more 
important (at least in the short term) than efficiency, and nations ought to have the 
right to tailor their competition laws to addresses these goals.161 The South African 
Competition Act was enacted in 1998 with the past in mind and, whilst the 
promotion and maintenance of competition remains the primary goal of competition 
law in South Africa,162
 
 the public interest also plays a crucial role. It is submitted 
that, in light of South Africa’s political and socio-economic history, the public 
interest plays a more important role in South African competition law than it 
ordinarily does in the competition law of developed nations such as the United States 
or the United Kingdom. It is furthermore submitted that the public interest will very 
often play a more important role in the competition laws of developing countries 
than in that of developed countries. 
In 2003, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation of Development 
(OECD) distributed a questionnaire to the competition authorities of a number of 
jurisdictions. The questionnaire addressed a number of issues, including competition 
law and public interest objectives. Notably, of the 35 respondents, 23 jurisdictions 
had as their objectives of domestic competition law, not only traditional competition 
objectives of efficiency and consumer welfare, but also public interest objectives.163
                                                                    
160 There are, in general, two approaches to Competition law. The approach characterised by the 
United States of America is one which is primarily concerned with cartel activity. As such, the two 
most pressing concerns are the artificial increase in prices and the artificial restriction of output. The 
European approach, however, addresses these concerns and more. It is also concerned with the ability 
of firms to enter markets and play a role in such markets. Despite the differences in approaches, it can 
broadly be said that competition law in the developed world, and much of the competition law in the 
developing world, is aimed at efficiency and consumer welfare. 
 
161 E.M Fox ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Competition law: Lessons from and for South African and 
Indonesia’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 579 at 593. 
162 As articulated earlier, the traditional aims of competition law are contained in the first two 
purposes of section 2 of the South African Act, namely, ‘to promote the efficiency, adaptability and 
development of the economy’ and ‘to provide consumers with competitive prices and product 
choices’. 
163 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Objectives of 
Competition Law and Policy (Note by Secretariat) OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/39/2486329.pdf [accessed 25 September 2009]. 
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Of these 23 respondents, it is very important to note that 16 of whom represented 
transitioning or developing countries.164
 
 These statistics highlight the importance 
that has been accorded to the public interest in the competition laws of developing 
countries. Further analysis continues below so as to highlight why such importance 
has been accorded to the public interest in such jurisdictions. 
8.1 South Africa 
The point concerning South Africa’s past has already been made – South 
Africa endured a history where a very small white minority exercised control over 
the country and the economy, to the detriment of the black majority. This national 
policy of racial national discrimination continued for forty years, the results of which 
are still being felt today. As a direct consequence, the disparity of wealth between 
the white minority and the black majority grew as black persons were not afforded, 
inter alia, access to the same level of education as the white minority, freedom of 
movement or the ability to effectively compete economically with white-owned and 
controlled companies. Essentially, significant access to, and influence over the South 
African economy was denied to black South Africans. 
 
The Competition Act actively seeks to address some of the problems caused 
by Apartheid and, as a result, the South African Act does not have as its only 
aspiration, efficiency and consumer welfare, instead, the public interest plays an 
important role. Eleanor Fox, in considering the role of equality in competition law in 
South Africa, argues that ‘until the disempowered fully participate in the economy, 
the efficiency potential of the nation is not likely to be realized’.165
                                                                    
164 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Objectives of 
Competition Law and Policy (Note by Secretariat) OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003. 
Available at 
 It is clearly Fox’s 
argument that competition laws may well be tailored to suit circumstances, 
especially in developing countries where a portion of the population is often 
disempowered and denied access to the economy. The Competition Act is tailored in 
this manner. It seeks to provide a platform for increasing the participation by the 
disempowered in the economy. Whilst the public interest portions of the Act will not 
only operate so as to benefit the black population, the majority of benefactors will 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/39/2486329.pdf [accessed 25 September 2009]. 
165 E.M Fox ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Competition law: Lessons from and for South African and 
Indonesia’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 579 at 593. 
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most likely be black, given that black persons constitute the majority of South 
Africa’s population and that the Act, in some sections, specifically targets the 
promotion of the interests of historically disadvantaged persons.166
 
 It is submitted 
that Fox is correct in her assessment of the importance of tailoring the competition 
laws of a country to suit its context. It is foreseeable that in decades to come, the 
competition laws of South Africa may be modified as South Africa moves to 
becoming a developed nation, and dire poverty, a high unemployment rate and the 
unfair consequences of Apartheid become less pervasive issues.  
Whilst the South African context is plain, it is not immediately clear whether 
the public interest should also play an important role in the competition 
jurisprudence of other developing nations. This paper now turns to consider the role 
of the public interest in two other jurisdictions, namely, Indonesia and Brazil, both of 
which have relatively recently implemented domestic competition laws. This paper 
will not engage with the competition laws of these countries in the same level of 
depth as that of South Africa, however, it will seek to draw conclusions between the 
substance of their competition laws and their contexts. A consideration of the 
competition laws, public interest and socio-economic and political contexts of two 
developed countries, namely, the United States of America and Australia, will also 
be undertaken. 
 
8.2 Indonesia 
8.2.1 Indonesian history and context167
 
 
To understand the context of Indonesian competition law, it is first necessary 
to consider Indonesia’s history from the date it attained independence. Indonesia 
declared independence from the Netherlands in 1945, shortly after the Japanese 
surrender, signalling the end of the Second World War.168
                                                                    
166 See for example, Competition Act s 12A(3)(c). 
  Sukarno was installed as 
the country’s first president, and his first assignment was to instil in the nation the 
167 For a helpful resource on Indonesian politics, especially in regard to the policies of President 
Suharto, see A Schwarz A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 
1994). 
168 Despite declaring independence in 1945, Indonesia’s independence was not recognised by the 
Netherlands until 1949.  
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philosophy of Pancasila, that is, a philosophy of national unity based upon five 
pillars: belief in one God, nationalism, humanity, sovereignty of the people, and 
social justice. Whilst the 1945 Indonesian Constitution,169 which was enacted shortly 
after Indonesia’s independence, does not expressly mention the philosophy of 
Pancasila, the philosophy is reflected in article 33 of the Constitution, which 
mentions the importance of co-operation, family unity and togetherness.170
 
 Since the 
installation of Sukarno, the principle of Pancasila has permeated Indonesian law, 
and is now recognised as the official philosophical foundation of the nation itself. 
President Sukarno was succeeded by President Suharto171 in 1967. Suharto 
too insisted upon the importance and the centrality of the philosophy of Pancasila. 
Suharto initiated ‘The New Order’172 in 1966, shortly before being proclaimed as 
President, as a means of reconstructing Indonesia after Sukarno’s presidency. The 
New Order was characterised by a number of distinct features that are relevant to the 
background of the Indonesian competition laws. Firstly, Indonesia’s economy was 
opened to foreign investors, however, Suharto’s government maintained control over 
key financial resources and licenses and, as a result, corruption, cronyism and 
nepotism flourished with members of Suharto’s family and government attaining 
significant, unmerited, wealth as a result.173 Secondly, Suharto sought to assimilate 
the minority174
                                                                    
169 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945. 
 ethnic Chinese-Indonesian population. In doing so, anti-Chinese 
legislation was passed which closed most Chinese-language newspapers, restricted 
Chinese religious expressions, banned Chinese-script in public places, closed 
Chinese-language schools and encouraged the adoption of Indonesian-sounding 
names by ethnic Chinese persons. Suharto’s policies largely restricted the role of the 
ethnic Chinese population to the commercial sector, and it is in this sector where 
170 E.M Fox ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Competition law: Lessons from and for South African and 
Indonesia’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 579 at 588. 
171 Suharto’s name is also spelt ‘Soeharto’. 
172 Or ‘Orde Baru’. 
173 E.M Fox ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Competition law: Lessons from and for South African and 
Indonesia’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 579 at 589. 
174 The most recent national population census was conducted by BPS-Statistics Indonesia in June 
2000 (the next census will take place during the course of 2010). The census shows that only 0.9 
percent of Indonesians considered themselves ethnic Chinese, though this figure may not be truly 
representative, as the census relied on ‘self-identification’ and many Chinese persons may have, in 
light of anti-Chinese sentiment by the majority, been reluctant to identify their Chinese ethnicity. 
BPS-Statistics Indonesia 2000 Census available at http://www.bps.go.id/eng/index.php [accessed 18 
August 2009]. 
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they excelled; forming large conglomerates, which eventually came to dominate the 
Indonesian economy.175 The results of these policies were visited harshly upon 
Indonesia, and largely contributed to Suharto’s downfall in 1998. Under Suharto, 
thirty years of strict civil liberties restriction and authoritarianism had fuelled 
dissatisfaction amongst the general population, culminating in the public rioting of 
1997 and 1998 and calls for a truly democratic state. The East-Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 further contributed to Suharto’s unpopularity at the time and exposed the 
inherent weaknesses in the Indonesian economy caused by Suharto’s policies. As a 
result of crony capitalism and excessive borrowing, the Indonesian economy was 
hard hit by the 1997 financial crisis, and the Rupiah176
 
 began to free fall. The result 
was a loss of confidence in Suharto’s presidency and policies by the domestic and 
international communities, whilst rioting continued throughout the country. These 
factors culminated in Suharto’s resignation on May 21st 1998, and an end to the 
‘New Order’. 
Shortly before President Suharto’s resignation, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) was invited to bail out Indonesia’s failing economy. The IMF obliged, 
but required a number of economic reforms before rescue monies would be 
provided; one such reform was the adoption of a domestic competition law by the 
Indonesian legislature, and Indonesia responded by promising to adopt such a 
competition law. A draft competition law was produced in 1998177
 
 and competition 
legislation (Law of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 5, Year 1999, Concerning the 
Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition) was finally 
adopted in 1999. 
                                                                    
175 It has been claimed that the Chinese minority controlled upwards of 70 percent of the Indonesian 
economy (see I Chalmers & V.R Hadiz (eds.) The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997); G Chavez ‘Outward Bound’ (1997) 11(2) Global Finance 
80.). Some scholars have, however, disputed this assertion and claimed that the market share of the 
Chinese minority was closer to 30 percent. See J.C.H Chai ‘Ethnic Inequality and Growth in 
Indonesia under the New Order’ Economics Conference Monograph Series (6) 1999 Department of 
Economics, University of Queensland. Available at 
http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:10480/ei_6_99.pdf [accessed 18 August 2009]. 
176 The official currency of Indonesia. 
177 People’s Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia, Draft Law of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Concerning Business Competition (July 1998). 
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8.2.2 The Indonesian competition Act 
In many ways, the Indonesian situation, immediately prior to the adoption of 
competition legislation, is similar to that of South Africa – a small minority 
dominated the market for a significant period of time to the detriment of the majority 
of the population, and economic concerns for the future of the country mandated the 
adoption of competition law.178 In Indonesia, the ethnic Chinese minority flourished 
through entrepreneurship, whilst thriving cronyism and corruption led to the 
advancement of a small minority of ethnic Indonesians, to the detriment of the 
majority of Indonesians. In South Africa, the White elite oppressed the Black 
majority and prevented them access to significant resources or market involvement, 
to their detriment. Furthermore, whilst not being identical, the Indonesian 
philosophical notion of Pancasila bears much resemblance to the notion of ubuntu179 
in South Africa, a value that, whilst not expressly included in the South African 
Constitution,180 has been found by the Constitutional Court to underlie the very 
Constitution itself.181
 
Further, ubuntu is not mentioned in the Competition Act 89 of 
1998, however, the Competition Act itself is subject to the supreme law, the 
Constitution, and as such the notion of ubuntu underlies even the Competition Act. 
Indonesian competition law, like that of South Africa, seeks to respond in 
some manner to the problems faced by the nation. This response can be seen in a 
number of sections of the Act that are discussed below. 
 
                                                                    
178 The adoption of competition legislation in Indonesia was compulsory if Indonesia was to escape 
the spiral of economic decline that it faced following the 1997 financial crisis. South Africa’s 
adoption of competition law was not forced in the same manner, though, it was recognised that if the 
new democratic South Africa was to emerge from the shadow of Apartheid, legislation had to be 
adopted which would address the issues of a market grossly dominated by White persons and made 
largely inaccessible to Black persons. It is therefore submitted that for both nations, the adoption of 
competition law was vital. 
179 Ubuntu, or, umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, has been translated into English to mean ‘a person is a 
person through other people’. It thus embodies the notions of togetherness, humanity and social 
justice. 
180 The word ubuntu does not appear in the final Constitution of 1996, although it does appear in the 
Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
181 In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupies 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 37, Sachs J 
found that ‘The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, 
suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a communitarian 
philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, 
institutionalised and operational declaration in our evolving new society of the need for human 
interdependence, respect and concern.’ 
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The Indonesian Act begins by stating in the preamble that ‘development in 
the field of economy must be directed toward the achievement of social welfare 
based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution’.182 Clearly, the very beginnings of the 
Act show an alignment not with a competitive economy, but with achieving social 
welfare through ‘belief in one God, nationalism, humanity, sovereignty of the 
people, and social justice’.183 Given Indonesia’s history and emphasis on the 
philosophy of Pancasila since (at least) 1945, it is difficult to imagine that this 
philosophy would not significantly pervade all aspects of Indonesian competition 
law. Importantly, the preamble also directly references the past economic history of 
Indonesia by stating that ‘there shall be no concentration of economic power in the 
hands of certain business actors’.184 This is clearly a reference to the situation under 
Suharto’s presidency which saw a concentration of the Indonesian economy among 
government cronies and elite ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs. The preamble of the Act 
shows that the Act seeks to ensure such a situation does not result again, and that 
‘fair and natural competition’ is maintained.185 Whilst such statements of the 
preamble appear to show that the Act is solely concerned with public welfare, the 
preamble also states that it aims at ‘the growth of the economy and the functioning 
of a reasonably market economy’.186
 
 
A consideration of Article 3 provides further illumination as to the purposes 
of the Indonesian competition statute. Whilst the preamble may have seemed to 
favour the anti-market philosophy of Pancasila, the purposes of the Act appear to 
aim at an efficient and competitive economy: 
 The purpose of enacting the Law shall be as follows: 
(a) to safeguard the interests of the public and to improve national economic efficiency 
as one of the efforts to improve the people’s welfare; 
(b) to create a conducive business climate through the stipulation of fair business 
competition in order to ensure the certainty of equal business opportunities for 
large–, middle–, as well as small–scale business actors in Indonesia; 
                                                                    
182 Law of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 5, Year 1999, Concerning the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, para (a). 
183 E.M Fox ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Competition law: Lessons from and for South African and 
Indonesia’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 579 at 588. 
184 Law of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 5, Year 1999, Concerning the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, para (c). 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid, para (b). 
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(c) to prevent monopolistic practices and/or unfair business competition that may be 
committed by business actors; and 
(d) the creation  of effectiveness and efficiency in business activities. 
Despite the apparent emphasis upon an efficient and competitive economy, the first 
purpose of the Act remains the improvement and safeguarding of public welfare, and 
thus the purposes section of the Act may well be interpreted as primarily favouring 
an interpretation that accords with the philosophy of Pancasila ahead of that of the 
market economy. 
 
Outside of the preamble and purposes section, the Indonesian competition 
Act reflects many well-tested principles of competition law. Chapter III of the Act 
prohibits a number of types of agreements, including agreements amongst 
competitors to control production,187 price-fixing agreements,188 agreements which 
result in price discrimination,189 agreements to fix a minimum resale price,190 and 
agreements to divide markets.191 Chapter IV of the Act is concerned with ‘Prohibited 
Activities’. The Act addresses the issue of monopolies (and monopsonies), and 
prohibits activities which may result in monopolistic practices or unfair 
competition.192 Further, the Act prohibits firms from impeding new business actors 
from conducting the same business as such firms,193 engaging in discriminatory 
practices toward such business actors,194 and selling products at low prices so as to 
force competitors out of business.195 Chapter V of the Act prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position by a firm (or firms),196 and prohibits mergers and acquisitions 
which may result in monopolistic practices or unfair competition.197
                                                                    
187 Law of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 5, Year 1999, Concerning the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, art 4. 
 
188 Ibid, art 5. This provision is similar in substance to that of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Competition 
Act 89 of 1998, which involves a per se prohibition against price-fixing. 
189 Ibid, art 6. This provision is similar in substance to that of section 9 of the Competition Act 89 of 
1998, which relates to the prohibition of price discrimination by dominant firms. 
190 Ibid, art 8. This provision is similar in substance to that of section 5(2) of the Competition Act 89 
of 1998, which involves a per se prohibition against the maintenance of a minimum resale price. 
191 Ibid, art 9. This provision is similar in substance to that of section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Competition 
Act 89 of 1998, which involves a per se prohibition against ‘dividing markets by allocating 
customers, suppliers, territories or specific types of goods of services’. 
192 Ibid, arts 17 and 18.  
193 Ibid, art 19(a). 
194 Ibid, art 19(d). 
195 Ibid, art 20. 
196 Ibid, arts 25-29. The prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position is also found in sections 6-9 
of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
197 Ibid, art 28. 
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Fox’s consideration of Indonesian competition law concludes with the 
statement that the Indonesian Act is ‘chameleon-like’ in its language and that the 
ambiguities in the Act can only be resolved by the Indonesian competition 
authorities. 198 On one hand, the Act appears to favour nothing less than the ‘anti-
market philosophy of Pancasila’,199 and on the other hand the Act strives for an 
efficient and competitive economy. Fox argues that the South African Act, whilst 
also being significantly infused with principles of equality, does not place as 
considerable an emphasis upon the public interest as does the Indonesian Act. The 
Competition Act attempts to achieve a balance between notions of fairness and 
efficiency in the purposes section of the Act and throughout the substantive 
provisions of the Act, which, ‘in almost all cases allows defences based on pro-
competitive and efficiency justifications’.200
 
  
It is submitted that the emphasis of the Indonesian competition Act is 
evidently informed by the philosophy of Pancasila and the economic history 
immediately preceding the enactment of the Act. Indonesian competition law, far 
from copying the competition laws of the United States of America or the European 
Commission, seeks to respond to circumstances, and it is for this reason that the Act 
is characterised as being ‘infused with principles of equality of opportunity’.201
 
 
Simply put, Indonesian competition law seeks to address Indonesian issues, and such 
issues require significant focus upon promoting the public interest. This paper does 
not seek to answer the question posed by Fox as to which course Indonesian 
competition law should adopt, rather, it seeks to show that every nation is entitled to 
adopt the competition laws that are tailor-made for such nation. 
It is conceded that many of the circumstances faced by Indonesia are 
circumstances caused and created by the policies of Suharto, however, they are 
policies which would not easily have been adopted without significant protest in the 
developed world. The problems of corruption, cronyism and tension between 
                                                                    
198 E.M Fox ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Competition law: Lessons from and for South African and 
Indonesia’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 579 at 592-593. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
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ethnicities, which characterised Suharto’s ‘New Order’, are problems common to 
many developing nations. South Africa faces similar issues as a developing nation – 
how to foster an efficient and competitive economy, whilst also addressing issues 
shaped by the past and present socio-economic circumstances. Given that the 
developed world is as the term implies – developed – issues such as gross poverty, 
the dominance of an ethnic minority over a market to the detriment of the ethnic 
majority, cronyism, corruption, nepotism and the like are not as pertinent as such 
issues are to the developing world. Indonesia is most certainly a developing country 
and, whilst it may not face issues identical to that of South Africa,202
 
 the issues it 
faces are ‘developing-world’ in character and, to address these problems, a 
competition law which places a high emphasis on the public interest may be most 
suitable. 
8.3 Brazil 
Another developing country relevant to this discussion which has enacted 
domestic competition law is Brazil.203 Much like South Africa, Brazil is a 
developing, or transitioning, economy, and faces a number of similar social and 
economic problems. It must be noted that both Brazil and South Africa are neither 
‘developed’ nations nor ‘least developed’ nations, and thus, by virtue of similar 
economic status, an analysis of Brazil and Brazilian competition law is of 
comparative value for South African law.204
 
 
8.3.1 The Brazilian context 
There are a number of similarities and differences between the challenges 
faced by the Brazilian and South African governments. When considering 
                                                                    
202 The unemployment rate, for example, is only 8.2 per cent in Indonesia. When contrasted to the rate 
of unemployment in South Africa (21.7 per cent), it is clear that the issue of unemployment is not as 
significant a concern in Indonesia as it is in South Africa. 
203 Competition Act (Federal Law 8.884/94). 
204 Both South Africa and Brazil are also commonly termed ‘Newly Industrialised Countries’ (NICs) 
by various economists. Whilst there is no consensus on the requirements for such a designation, the 
designation is commonly reflective of a country which, whilst neither conforming to the category of 
‘developed’ nor ‘developing’, is undergoing significant economic growth that places the country on 
the path to becoming a ‘developed’ nation. Other countries that are commonly designated as NICs 
include Mexico, India, China, (as well as Indonesia by some economists). For further reading, see, P 
Bożyk Globalization and the Transformation of Foreign Economic Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2006). 
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employment, it is noticeable that the South African unemployment rate of 22.9 per 
cent is significantly higher than that of Brazil’s, which is estimated at only 7.9 per 
cent.205 Whilst this low employment rate is comparable with much of the developed 
world, many Brazilians are employed as low-paid labourers, and this gross income 
inequality in Brazil is evidenced by a high Gini co-efficient206 of 56.7.207 It is further 
estimated that 31 per cent of all Brazilians lives below the poverty line.208 The 
economics of Brazil are comparable with South Africa. South Africa’s 2005 Gini co-
efficient estimate is 65,209 which is higher than that of Brazil, but comparable. 
Further, it is estimated that up to 50 per cent of all South Africans live below the 
poverty line.210
 
 Whilst it is clear that the economic realities of Brazil are less severe 
than that of South Africa, it is clear too that Brazil faces significant socio-economic 
challenges that are not ‘developed nation’ in character. 
Whilst there are many similarities, there are also clear differences. Most 
importantly is that Brazil does not exhibit a history of one ethnic or racial minority 
exercising decisive control over the economy, to the exclusion and detriment of the 
majority. This has been shown to inform the competition law of both South Africa 
and Indonesia; however, such considerations will not inform Brazilian competition 
law. Thus, whilst public interest considerations might play a role in competition law 
in Brazil, such considerations will not, for example, include seeking to advance the 
interests of historically disadvantaged persons. 
 
                                                                    
205 CIA World Factbook (Brazil). Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/br.html [accessed 29 September 2009]. 
206 It is conceded that the Gini co-efficient is not a decisive tool of measurement of the political, social 
and economic status of countries. Whilst it may be of comparable economic and political value, many 
other factors, such as the size of nation, influence this value. Further, a Gini co-efficient does not 
measure total wealth, simply the inequality of wealth. An example of the problem with this tool is 
exhibited in the instance of Indonesia and the United States. The Indonesian Gini co-efficient is 
estimated at 39.7, which is lower even than that of the United States of America. It is patently clear, 
however, that the United States, as a nation, is far more developed and the population of the United 
States have access to far more advanced facilities than that of Indonesia. It is, nevertheless, obvious 
that, in general, developed nations of the world, and especially of Europe, exhibit lower Gini co-
efficients than that of developing nations. 
207 CIA World Factbook (Brazil). Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/br.html [accessed 29 September 2009]. 
208 Ibid. 
209 CIA World Factbook (South Africa). Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/sf.html [accessed 29 September 2009]. 
210 Ibid. 
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It is submitted that, particularly as a result of the poverty and economic 
inequality in Brazil, the public interest may play a significant role in Brazilian 
competition law. 
 
8.4.2 Brazilian competition law 
Brazil enacted domestic competition law in 1994, earlier than both South 
Africa and Indonesia. After fifteen years of development, an analysis of these laws 
will aid in showing the value of the public interest in the competition laws of 
developing countries.  
 
The precise objectives of competition law in Brazil are difficult to determine. 
Unlike the South African Competition Act, the Brazilian Competition Act does not 
list a number of specific objectives that the Act seeks to achieve, instead, the Act 
lists a single object, framed in very general and vague terms in article 1: 
This statute sets out antitrust measures in keeping with such constitutional principles as free 
enterprise and open competition, the social role of property, consumer protection, and 
restraint of abuses of economic power. 
Article 1 is clearly very different from section 2 of the South Africa Competition 
Act. Instead of listing specific objectives such as, ‘to provide consumers with 
competitive prices and product choices’211 and ‘to promote a greater spread of 
ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically 
disadvantaged persons’,212 reference is made by article 1 to constitutional principles 
contained within the Federal Constitution of Brazil.213
The economic order, founded on the appreciation of the value of human work and on free 
enterprise, is intended to ensure everyone a life with dignity, in accordance with the dictates 
of social justice, with due regard for the following principles: 
 Such principles are found in 
article 170 of the Constitution and, whilst not exclusively applicable to competition 
law, such principles concern all economic activity within Brazil and significantly 
inform Brazilian competition law: 
I. national sovereignty; 
II. private property; 
III. the social function of property; 
                                                                    
211 Competition Act s 2(b). 
212 Competition Act s 2(f). 
213 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, 1988. 
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IV. free competition; 
V. consumer protection; 
VI. environmental protection, including by means of different treatments in accordance 
to the environmental impact of products and services and their respective 
production and rendering; 
VII. reduction of regional and social differences; 
VIII. pursuit of full employment; 
IX. preferential treatment for small enterprises organised under Brazilian laws and 
having their head-office and management in Brazil.   
Sole paragraph - Free exercise of any economic activity is ensured to everyone, regardless of 
authorization from government agencies, except in the cases set forth by laws. 
 
Whilst reference to these principles sheds some light on the objectives of 
competition law in Brazil, the precise objectives are no clearer. The principles of 
article 170 appear to, on the one hand, reflect ‘public interest’ goals such as 
employment and preferential treatment of small enterprises, and on the other hand 
reflect traditional market-economy goals evidenced by the emphasis upon private 
property by article 170. Paragraph 4 of article 173 of the Federal Constitution 
provides further insight into the aims of competition law and the control of economic 
power in Brazil:  
With the exception of the cases set forth in this Constitution, the direct exploitation of an 
economic activity by the State shall only be allowed whenever needed to the imperative 
necessities of the national security or to a relevant collective interest, as defined by law. 
... 
Paragraph 4 - The law shall repress the abuse of economic power that aims at the domination 
of markets, the elimination of competition and the arbitrary increase of profits.  
... 
Clearly, Brazilian competition law seeks to enhance consumer welfare by 
repressing abuses of economic power which may result in market dominance to the 
detriment of consumers, elimination of competition to the detriment of consumer and 
the arbitrary increase of profits to the detriment of consumers. It is also clear that 
Brazilian competition law seeks to balance free enterprise with concerns of social 
justice and article 170 is reflective of this: 
The economic order, founded on the appreciation of the value of human work and on free 
enterprise, is intended to ensure everyone a life with dignity, in accordance with the dictates 
of social justice... (my emphasis). 
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Despite considering the objects section of the Act and the referenced 
provisions of the Constitution, it is obvious that the precise boundaries of listed 
principles and objectives cannot clearly be defined.214 At the 2003 OECD Global 
Forum on Competition, the Brazilian competition authorities themselves recognised 
the lack of clarity as to the objectives of Brazilian competition law, stating that:215
Evidently, principles are generic formulae, incapable of a clear definition of the boundaries 
within which their applicability will arise. For instance, it is possible to find, amongst the 
many clauses inserted in the statute, other legislative goals, either conditioning or mitigating 
the direct application of the above mentioned principles. 
 
This paper now turns to consider the substantive sections of the Brazilian 
Competition Act, that is, sections 20, 21 and 54, and to consider the extent to which 
public interest objectives are included in the competition law of Brazil. 
 
Articles 20 and 21 of the Act deal with all types of anticompetitive conduct, 
other than mergers. A consideration of these articles outlines prohibited 
anticompetitive conduct; however no reference is made to the achievement of any 
public interest goals. The South African and Indonesian examples highlighted that 
provisions outlining anticompetitive conduct (other than mergers) such as price-
fixing, are aimed not at promoting goals of the public interest, rather, it has been 
assumed that conduct such as price-fixing is anticompetitive and generally harmful 
to the public interest. As such, specific public interest considerations and goals, such 
as promoting employment, do not play a role in the context of such anticompetitive 
conduct. Instead, the achievement of public interest goals finds its application in 
other arenas of competition law, and in particular, in the realm of merger control. 
 
Article 54 of the Act concerns mergers, acquisitions and similar transactions 
The article provides: 
Article 54. Any acts that may limit or otherwise restrain open competition, or that result in 
the control of relevant markets for certain products or services, shall be submitted to CADE 
for review. 
Paragraph 1. CADE may authorize any acts referred to in the main section of this article, 
provided that they meet the following requirements: 
                                                                    
214 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Questionnaire on the 
Objectives of Competition Law and Policy and the Optimal Design of a Competition Agency (Brazil) 
OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003 at 3. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/7/2485784.pdf [accessed 25 September 2009]. 
215 Ibid. 
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I. they shall be cumulatively or alternatively intended to: 
(a) increase productivity; 
(b) improve the quality of a product or service; or 
(c) cause an increased efficiency, as well as foster the technological or economic 
development; 
II. the resulting benefits shall be rateably allocated among their participants, on the one 
part, and consumers or end-users, on the other; 
III. they shall not drive competition out of a substantial portion of the relevant market for a 
product or service; and 
IV. only the acts strictly required to attain an envisaged objective shall be performed for that 
purpose. 
Paragraph 2. Any action under this article may be considered lawful if at least three of the 
requirements listed in the above items are met, whenever any such action is taken in the 
public interest or otherwise required to the benefit of the Brazilian economy, provided no 
damages are caused end-consumers or users. 
Paragraph 2 of article 54 clearly provides that otherwise anticompetitive mergers 
may be approved if they in the public interest or required for the benefit of the 
Brazilian economy, and provided that at least three requirements under Paragraph 1 
are met and that end-consumers suffer no damages. This would appear to indicate the 
importance of public interest goals as listed in the Constitution, when considering 
mergers. It is submitted by the Brazilian competition authorities, however, that the 
exception described in Paragraph 2 has never been invoked or applied and that it 
constitutes nothing more than a ‘theoretical escape valve’.216
 
 
In 2001, the ‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’217 were published by the 
SEAE.218
                                                                    
216 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Questionnaire on the 
Objectives of Competition Law and Policy and the Optimal Design of a Competition Agency (Brazil) 
OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003 at 3. Available at 
 These guidelines indicate that, even in regard to mergers, the Brazilian 
competition authorities are concerned with traditional competition goals, and not the 
public interest, and that the public interest may have a role to play, though this role is 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/7/2485784.pdf [accessed 25 September 2009]. 
217Joint Directive SEAE/SDE No. 50 01/08/2001 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Available at 
http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/document_center/legislation/annex-7_guidelines_brazil.pdf [accessed 
23 November 2009]. 
218 Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econômico (Secretariat for Economic Monitoring). 
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minor and is referred to only as the ‘effect on the economy as a whole’ of the 
proposed merger.219
 
 
It is thus clear that, despite the escape valve of Paragraph 2 of article 54 of 
the Act, the Brazilian competition authorities are largely unconcerned with the 
advancement of public interest goals, though the authorities have appeared willing to 
grant consent decrees to public interest values in some circumstances, to merger 
approval. The state of Brazilian competition law, as regards public interest 
objectives, is perhaps best summarised by the Brazilian submission as to the 
objectives competition law in Brazil, submitted at the 2003 Global Forum on 
Competition:220
Despite the fact that the Competition Act of 1994 contemplates the sheer possibility of taking 
into consideration arguments related to values like employment, economic development, as 
well as national interest to approve mergers and acquisitions otherwise deemed harmful to 
competition, these escape clauses have been solemnly ignored in the current practice. 
Notwithstanding, some Consent Decrees (‘Compromissos de Desempenho’) issued by the 
CADE as means of barring harmful effects of concentrations have include measures aiming 
at such values, although they have not been determining conditions for the clearance. 
 
 
8.3.2 Contrasting Brazilian and South African competition laws 
Evidently, whilst the objectives of Brazilian competition law are unclear, the 
practice of competition law in Brazil has revealed that the authorities are concerned 
with traditional competition law objectives, and not with those as relating to the 
public interest. 
 
South African law and practices explicitly recognises certain public interest 
considerations in the realms of mergers and exemptions, though practically, the 
authorities have been reluctant to attach too significant a role to these considerations. 
This reluctance is also exhibited by the Brazilian competition authorities, the 
difference being, however, that the public interest considerations in the Brazilian Act 
                                                                    
219 Joint Directive SEAE/SDE No. 50 01/08/2001 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at para 23. Available 
at http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/document_center/legislation/annex-7_guidelines_brazil.pdf 
[accessed 23 November 2009]. 
220 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Questionnaire on the 
Objectives of Competition Law and Policy and the Optimal Design of a Competition Agency (Brazil) 
OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003 at 4. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/7/2485784.pdf [accessed 25 September 2009]. 
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are not listed explicitly, but rather reference is made to general principles in the 
Brazilian Constitution. 
 
The South African and Brazilian competition authorities shall similar practice 
in that South African authorities, though permitted to do so under law, are unwilling 
to approve anticompetitive mergers that nevertheless further the public interest. The 
same is true of the Brazilian competition authorities who, though empowered to do 
so under paragraph 2 of article 54, are unwilling to approve anticompetitive mergers 
on public interest grounds. It is further clear that both South African and Brazilian 
competition authorities prefer to attach conditions, or consent decrees, to merger 
approval where some public interest may be harmed. Though such conditions will in 
most cases be significant, future circumstances may arise which may require the 
authorities to act in the public interest, and the utter disregard of paragraph 2 by the 
Brazilian authorities, and section 12A by the South African authorities, may not only 
result in public interest objectives being undermined, but also result in significant 
damage to the public interest. 
 
8.4 The United States of America 
It must of course be remembered that competition law has its fullest origins 
in the United States of America. American antitrust law began as a response to 
circumstances – cartel activity by American firms led to an artificial restriction of 
output and an increase in the price of products – and it was to this problem that 
American legislators responded by enacting the Sherman Act.221
 
 It is evident then, 
that like all law, antitrust law began as a response to a particular set of circumstances 
in a particular context. Whilst competition law has progressed and developed since 
the enactment of the Sherman Act and whilst competition law principles have been 
reviewed and improved, it remains to be argued that the origins of competition law 
are in responding to cartel activity in the United States and, therefore, that the best 
competition laws for developing countries may be competition laws that responds to 
the particular circumstances of developing countries. 
                                                                    
221 The Sherman Act, July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §1-7. Further US legislation has 
followed the Sherman Act, however, the Sherman Act remains as the most important antitrust statute 
in the United States. 
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The American social and economic context is notably different to that of 
South Africa. Listed below are four key issues which differentiate the American and 
South African contexts. Firstly, it must be noted at the outset that the American 
context is one which can most certainly be described as ‘developed’, unlike South 
Africa.222
 
 Secondly, the racial demographics in American are significantly different 
to that of South Africa.  The US African-American civil rights movement of the 
1960’s was a response to racial discrimination by the white majority, however, even 
now, approximately only 13 per cent of the US population is classified as African-
American, with 80 per cent classified as white. As such, affirmative action policies 
and policies which seek to address raced-based injustices are considerably less 
important in the USA. Thirdly, the United States did not suffer from the enforcement 
of international sanctions, whereas Apartheid South Africa was shunned from access 
to international markets, thus causing considerable harm to the nation. Fourthly, the 
current American unemployment rate is estimated at 7.2 per cent, which it notably 
lower than South Africa’s unemployment rate of 22.9 per cent, most of whom are 
black South Africans. As such, employment is not as important a concern in the 
United States as it is in South Africa. With such clear differences in context, it is not 
surprising that American and South African competition laws differ somewhat. 
When one considers the various statues enacted by the US legislators over the 
past century, it becomes quite clear that American antitrust law has undergone 
significant development. If American antitrust law has been allowed to develop, it 
would be unreasonable to expect that the (relatively new) South African competition 
laws or the new competition laws of other developing countries, to be ‘perfect’ from 
their inception. Despite the developments in competition law in the United States 
and European Union, such developments are most often mere reflections of prevalent 
economic circumstances, political climates and academic theories. Critiques of the 
competition law of developing countries for taking somewhat different approaches to 
                                                                    
222 The exact set of criteria used to measure whether a country falls within the ‘developed’ or 
‘developing’ category, continues to remain a contentious issue. Even the United Nations has admitted 
that ‘there is no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries 
or areas in the United Nations system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United 
States in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are considered 
"developed" regions or areas.’ United Nations Statistics Division, Composition of macro 
geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other 
groupings.  Available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnc [accessed 25 
September 2009]. 
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competition law than those prevalent in the developed world, are, it is submitted, 
sometimes unjustified. As Hovenkamp argues, theories of economics and 
competition law undergo alteration over time and even the once hallowed ‘Chicago 
school’ conception of competition law now has many critics.223
 
 It must be borne in 
mind, therefore, that competition law, like all other law, is not static and may be 
adapted to the circumstances. 
As articulated in chapter seven, the thrust of American antitrust law is the 
promotion of economic efficiency and the maximisation of consumer welfare. 
American antitrust law has developed to this point in time to consider these two 
named objectives as the only appropriate objectives of antitrust law. The trend of 
international jurisprudence shows that the public interest, as an objective of 
competition law, is becoming increasingly disregarded by the competition regulators 
of developed countries, such as the United States, though such public interest 
objectives continue to be invoked by the competition regulators of developing and 
transitioning countries, such as South Africa and Indonesia. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                    
223 H Hovenkamp ‘Antitrust Policy after Chicago’ (1985) 84 Mich. L. Rev 213 at 213. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
The vital question this paper has sought to answer is: has the correct 
approach been struck between traditional competition goals and public interest goals 
in South Africa?  
 
The role of competition law in any nation must always be chiefly concerned 
with the promotion and maintenance competition, for that is precisely what 
competition law demands. This is uncontested. Competition authorities224
 
 are, at 
least in South Africa’s case, unelected bodies, and should be wary of transgressing 
their designated functions of applying the law, however, South Africa competition 
law does attach weigh to specific public interest considerations, and as such, these 
considerations should be given effect to. 
It has been argued that competition laws may be tailored according to a 
nation’s context. It is for the legislators of nations to decide what form of 
competition law is suitable, and it would not be necessarily unreasonable for the 
legislature of a developing country to adopted competition laws very similar to those 
in force in the European Union, however, it is well within the rights of a national 
legislature to adopt ordinary principles of competition law, with slight adjustments to 
take into account the different context of that nation. A consideration of the political 
and socio-economic contexts of some developing nations reveals that the problems 
faced by and experienced in those nations, are sometimes substantially different in 
nature to those experienced in developed nations. Issues such as dire poverty, 
substantial unemployment, entrenched racism, cronyism and nepotism are most often 
not experienced in developed countries or at least not to the same degree as in 
developing countries. Such issues inevitably influence the economy of developing 
nations and, as such, may well influence the competition laws of developing nations. 
 
Turning to South Africa, it is submitted that the South African Competition 
Act is not merely an ‘antitrust statute, albeit with a public interest aspect’225 and 
neither is it ‘an unchecked vehicle for redistribution’226
                                                                    
224 That is, the Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal and Competition Appeals Court. 
 or a statute primarily 
225 Anglo American Holdings Ltd/Kumba Resources Ltd 46/LM/Jun02 para 156. 
226 Ibid. 
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concerned with the public interest. The South African Competition Act is, first and 
foremost, a competition statute, however it is also intimately tied up with South 
Africa’s past and, as such, is particularly concerned with the interests of public of 
South Africa. It is conceded that striking a balance between market-driven 
competition in an economy and consideration of the public interest, is a difficult 
task. The South African courts have attempted to strike this balance and have, for the 
most part, done so well. It must be stated, however, that the authorities have perhaps 
been eager to diminish the role that the public interest plays in the realms of merger 
control and exemptions in South Africa. 
 
The objectives of the Competition Act are clear: whilst traditional 
competition goals are accorded primacy, secondary goals such as the promotion of 
employment and advancement of the interests of historically disadvantaged persons, 
apply. The fullest effect to these public interest objectives is manifest in sections 10 
and 12A. It is submitted, however, that the competition authorities have, especially 
with regard to merger control, adopted an approach which largely ignores the public 
interest grounds which must be considered in a merger evaluation. Consideration of 
the public interest grounds of section 12A(3) is an imperative – the authorities 
should be willing, in exceptional circumstances, to not impose public interest related 
conditions upon merger approval, but possibly even refuse a merger purely based on 
public interest grounds. Furthermore, the importance of the public interest in South 
Africa, and for most developing countries, requires the competition authorities to, 
though in highly unlikely circumstances, approve an otherwise anticompetitive 
merger on the grounds that it enhances the public interest to a significant degree. 
 
A comparative analysis has revealed that South Africa’s socio-economic 
context and history is unique. The Indonesian context bears some resemblance, and 
as result, the competition laws of Indonesia are similar, placing a significant 
emphasis upon the public interest. Brazil too, shows that, at least from the 
perspective of the legislature, broad public interest objectives may trump traditional 
competition goals in certain circumstances. The American approach clearly cannot 
be transplanted to developing jurisdictions, where different social and economic 
challenges await competition regulators. 
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Returning to the original question of this paper: have the public interest 
objectives of the South African Competition Act been realised, the answer is neither 
yes nor no. Whilst imposing conditions upon mergers will often cater for the 
interests of the public, such conditions will sometimes be insufficient. Both the past, 
and the present context, requires the competition authorities to carefully weigh the 
public interest, though this appears to be something the authorities are wary of doing 
for fear of undermining the underlying traditional purposes of competition law, that 
is, economic efficiency and consumer welfare. 
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